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ABSTRACT	
In	2019,	the	United	States	District	Court	for	the	Eastern	District	
of	Michigan	struck	down	the	FGM	Act,	a	1996	statute	which	makes	
performing	female	genital	mutilation	a	federal	crime.	The	court	held	
that	 the	 FGM	 Act	 was	 an	 unconstitutional	 overstep	 of	 Congress’	
authority	 to	 regulate	 interstate	 commerce	 under	 the	 Commerce	
Clause,	since	FGM	is	not	“economic	in	nature.”	Additionally,	the	court	
held	that	the	government	could	not	justify	the	FGM	Act	as	an	exercise	
of	Congress’	authority	to	implement	the	International	Covenant	on	
Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (the	 “ICCPR”),	 since	 the	 court	 did	 not	
interpret	 the	 plain	 language	 of	 the	 treaty	 as	 a	 commitment	 to	
eradicate	FGM.	This	Note	argues	that	although	the	court’s	“economic	
in	 nature”	 holding	 properly	 applied	 an	 increasingly	 narrow	
interpretation	of	 the	Commerce	Clause,	 its	 ICCPR	holding	 failed	 to	
consider	 extra-textual	 sources	 usually	 employed	 in	 treaty	
interpretation.	 This	 Note	 also	 suggests	 that	 Congress	 may	 have	
clearer	authority	to	criminalize	FGM	if	the	United	States	ratified	the	
Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 Discrimination	 Against	 Women	
(“CEDAW”),	a	treaty	the	United	States	has	only	signed.	
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I.	INTRODUCTION	Approximately	200	million	women	and	girls	worldwide	are	victims	of	some	form	of	female	genital	mutilation	(“FGM”),1	defined	by	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 as	 the	
                                                        1.	 See	 G.A.	 Res.	 71/168,	 at	 2	 (Feb.	 2,	 2017)	 [hereinafter	G.A.	 Res.];	Female	 genital	
mutilation	 (FGM),	 WORLD	 HEALTH	 ORG.	 [WHO]	 (2013),	https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/fgm/prevalence/en/	[https://perma.cc/6HE6-22NM]	(last	visited	Apr.	5,	2020).	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1297	“piercing,	cutting,	removing,	or	sewing	closed	all	or	part	of	a	girl’s	or	woman’s	external	genitals	for	no	medical	reason.”2	Although	the	cultural	 and	 religious	 practice	 is	 most	 common	 in	 Africa,	 the	Middle	East,	and	Southeast	Asia,3	 researchers	estimate	 that	over	513,000	women	and	girls	in	the	United	States	are	FGM	victims,	or	are	 at	 risk	 of	 FGM.4	 FGM	 is	 recognized	 as	 an	 egregious	 human	rights	violation,	as	it	increases	a	victim’s	vulnerability	to	infection,	HIV,	 hepatitis,	 and	 reproductive	 health	 problems.5	 Despite	 the	well-documented	 medical	 dangers	 associated	 with	 FGM,6	 only	thirty-five	states	have	criminalized	FGM	procedures	as	of	2019.7	In	1996,	Congress	passed	the	Female	Genital	Mutilation	Act	(the	“FGM	Act”),8	which	makes	performing	FGM	on	victims	under	the	 age	 of	 eighteen	 a	 federal	 crime.9	 Specifically,	 section	 116(a)	imposes	fines	and/or	imprisonment	of	no	longer	than	five	years	for	anyone	 who	 “knowingly	 circumcises,	 excises,	 or	 infibulates	 the	whole	or	any	part	of	the	labia	majora	or	labia	minora	or	clitoris	of	another	 person	 who	 has	 not	 attained	 the	 age	 of	 18	 years.”10	
                                                        2.	 Female	 Genital	 Mutilation	 or	 Cutting,	 OFF.	 WOMEN’S	 HEALTH	 (Apr.	 1,	 2019)	https://www.womenshealth.gov/a-z-topics/female-genital-cutting#17	[https://perma.cc/GN8V-8FMA].	3.		See	 Jewel	Llamas,	Female	Circumcision:	The	History,	the	Current	Prevalence	and	the	
Approach	 to	 a	 Patient	 (Apr.	 2017),	 https://med.virginia.edu/family-medicine/wp-content/uploads/sites/285/2017/01/Llamas-Paper.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/5RPU-X2PZ];	Wanda	K.	Jones	et	al.,	Female	Genital	Mutilation/Female	Circumcision,	PUBLIC	HEALTH	REP.	368,	 370	 (1997),	https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1381943/pdf/pubhealthrep00038-0014.pdf	[https://perma.cc/XDX4-Y443].	4.	 See	Howard	Goldberg	et	al.,	Female	Genital	Mutilation/Cutting	in	the	United	States:	
Updated	 Estimates	 of	 Women	 and	 Girls	 at	 Risk,	 NIH	 (2012),	https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4765983/	 [https://perma.cc/CL85-BSAN]	(explaining	that	the	study	was	unable	to	distinguish	between	women	in	the	United	States	who	had	actually	undergone	FGM,	and	women	at	risk	of	FGM).	5.	 See	G.A.	Res.,	supra	note	1,	at	2;	Goldberg	et	al.,	supra	note	4.	6.	 See	 Health	 Risks	 of	 Female	 Genital	 Mutilation	 (FGM),	 WHO,	https://www.who.int/sexual-and-reproductive-health/health-risks-of-female-genital-mutilation	[https://perma.cc/9D9K-KKP7]	(last	visited	Mar.	18,	2020).	7.	 See	 FGM	 Legislation	 by	 State,	 AHA	 FOUNDATION,	https://www.theahafoundation.org/female-genital-mutilation/fgm-legislation-by-state/	[https://perma.cc/9YJ8-L6SV]	(last	visited	Mar.	18,	2020).	8.		See	 18	U.S.C.	§	116(a)	(1996).	9.	 See	id.;	Michelle	E.	Shember,	Female	Genital	Mutilation	and	the	First	Amendment:	
An	Analysis	of	State	Fgm	Statutes	and	the	Right	to	Free	Exercise,	96	U.	DET.	MERCY	L.	REV.	431,	436	(2019);	Sohail	Wahedi,	The	Health	Law	Implications	of	Ritual	Circumcisions,	22	QUINNIPIAC	HEALTH	L.J.	209,	212	(2019).	10.	 18	U.S.C.	§	116(a)	(1996).	
1298	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	Although	 the	 FGM	 Act	 has	 been	 in	 effect	 since	 1996,	 the	 US	Department	of	Justice	(the	“DOJ”)	has	only	brought	charges	under	the	act	twice:	once	in	200511	and	more	recently	in	United	States	v.	
Nagarwala,12	 which	 is	 the	 first	 time	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	FGM	 Act	 has	 been	 challenged	 as	 exceeding	 the	 scope	 of	Congressional	authority.13	In	Nagarwala,	eight	defendants	were	charged	under	the	FGM	Act	 for	performing	or	assisting	 in	the	FGM	of	 four	young	girls	 in	Michigan.14	 The	 government	 alleged	 that	 emergency	 room	physician	 Dr.	 Jumana	 Nagarwala	 performed	 the	 FGM	 with	assistants	Farida	Attar	and	Tahera	Shafiq.15	The	indictment	further	alleged	that	Dr.	Fakhruddin	Attar	allowed	Dr.	Nagarwala	to	use	his	clinic	 in	Michigan	 for	 the	procedures.16	 The	 four	mothers	 of	 the	victims,	members	of	the	Dawoodi	Bohra	Shiite	Muslim	community,	were	also	charged	for	bringing	their	daughters	to	the	clinic	from	Michigan,	 Illinois,	 and	 Minnesota,	 knowing	 that	 their	 daughters	would	be	mutilated.17	Some	of	the	daughters	later	told	police	that	the	mothers	had	told	them	they	were	going	on	a	“special	girls	trip,”	and	 that	 they	 were	 going	 to	 a	 doctor’s	 office	 to	 “get	 the	 germs	out.”18	 Bohras	 who	 practice	 FGM	 disagree	 over	 the	 cultural	purpose	 for	 the	 procedure.19	Where	 some	 see	 it	 as	 a	method	 of	
                                                        11.	 See	United	States.	v.	Nagarwala,	 350	F.	Supp.	3d	613,	627	(E.D.	Mich.	2018);	TWO	
WHO	 PLOTTED	 TO	 PERFORM	 FEMALE	 GENITAL	MUTILATION	 SENTENCED	 TO	 FEDERAL	
PRISON,	 DEP’T	 OF	 JUST.	 (June	 8,	 2005),	https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2005/089.html	[https://perma.cc/KR7Z-2M78];	 Daniel	 Rice,	 Female	 Genital	 Mutilation	 and	 the	 Treaty	
Power:	 What	 Congress	 Can	 Do,	 JUST	 SECURITY	 (Oct.	 29,	 2019),	https://www.justsecurity.org/66757/female-genital-mutilation-and-the-treaty-power-what-congress-can-do/	[https://perma.cc/92WJ-LXPD]	(last	visited	Apr.	5,	2020).	12.	 See	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	613.	13.	 See	Pam	Belluck,	Federal	Ban	on	Female	Genital	Mutilation	Ruled	Unconstitutional	
by	Judge,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Nov.	21,	2018),	https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/health/fgm-female-genital-mutilation-law.html	[https://perma.cc/8R9Q-DHEZ].	14.	 See	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	615–16.	15.	 See	id.	16.	 See	id.	17.	 See	id.;	Belluck,	supra	note	13.	18.	 Criminal	Complaint	at	7,	United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613	(E.D.	Mich.	 2018),	 available	 at	 https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/957381/download	[https://perma.cc/JA9F-PGKC].	19.	 Fahrinisa	 Campana,	 In	 India’s	 Dawoodi	 Bohra	 community,	 there’s	 a	 growing	
debate	 about	 FGM,	 PUB.	 RADIO	 INTL.	 (Aug.	 2,	 2018,	 9:45AM),	https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-08-02/indias-dawoodi-bohra-community-theres-growing-debate-about-fgm [https://perma.cc/N9NC-CDN8];	Tasneem	Raja,	I	Underwent	
Genital	Mutilation	as	a	Child—Right	Here	in	the	United	States,	MOTHER	JONES	(Apr.	21,	2017),	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1299	curbing	 female	 promiscuity,	 others	 falsely	 believe	 it	 promotes	hygiene.20	 Although	 the	 government	 alleged	 that	 Dr.	 Nagarwala	performed	FGM	on	nine	victims,21	 federal	prosecutors	estimated	that	Dr.	Nagarwala	may	have	actually	performed	FGM	on	over	one	hundred	girls.22	First,	 Judge	 Bernard	 A.	 Friedman	 of	 the	 Eastern	 District	 of	Michigan	 held	 that	 the	 FGM	 Act	 was	 not	 a	 valid	 exercise	 of	Congress’s	 power	 to	 pass	 treaty-implementing	 legislation.23	 The	government	 attempted	 to	 rely	 on	 two	 provisions	 in	 the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(the	“ICCPR”),	a	1966	United	Nations	treaty	with	seventy-four	signatory	parties,	to	justify	the	federal	FGM	ban.24	Article	3	is	the	United	States’	treaty	commitment	to	“ensure	the	equal	right	of	men	and	women	to	the	enjoyment	of	all	civil	and	political	rights	set	 forth	 in	 the	present	Covenant,”25	 and	Article	 24	 states	 that	 “[e]very	 child	 shall	 have,	without	 any	 discrimination	 as	 to	 race,	 colour,	 sex,	 language,	religion,	 national	 or	 social	 origin,	 property	 or	 birth,	 the	 right	 to	such	 measures	 of	 protection	 as	 are	 required	 by	 his	 status	 as	 a	minor,	on	the	part	of	his	family,	society	and	the	State.”26	The	court	explained	that	“as	laudable	as	the	[FGM	Act]	may	be,”	FGM	bears	no	 rational	 relationship	 to	 the	 ICCPR	 treaty	 provisions,	 and	 is	therefore	not	a	valid	exercise	of	Congress’s	power	to	pass	treaty-implementing	legislation.27	Second,	the	court	held	that	the	government	cannot	justify	the	FGM	 Act	 as	 a	 valid	 exercise	 of	 Congress’	 power	 to	 regulate	
                                                        https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/genital-cutting-indian-doctor-women-khatna/	[https://perma.cc/33J3-SS3K].	20.	 Id.	21.	 Id.	22.	 U.S.	Immigr.	&	Customs	Enforcement,	ICE	fights	to	protect	girls	and	women	from	
mutilation	 and	 abuse,	 DEP’T	 OF	 HOMELAND	 SECURITY	 (Nov.	 20,	 2017),	https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-fights-protect-girls-and-women-mutilation-and-abuse	 [https://perma.cc/VH4R-S8EE];	 Robert	 Snell,	 Genital	 mutilation	 case	 could	
involve	 up	 to	 100	 victims,	 DETROIT	 NEWS	 (June	 7,	 2017,	 4:25PM)	https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/06/07/feds-estimate-genital-mutilation-victims/102594478/	[https://perma.cc/9F8U-2XSF].	23.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	620-21.	24.	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	Dec.	19,	1966,	999	U.N.T.S.	171	[hereinafter	ICCPR].	25.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	617-18;	ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	3.	26.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	617-18;	ICCPR	supra	note	24,	art.	4.		27.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	618.	
1300	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	interstate	commerce	under	the	Commerce	Clause.28	Although	the	Commerce	 Clause	 has	 been	 a	 broad	 source	 of	 Congressional	authority	for	most	of	the	Twentieth	Century,29	the	Supreme	Court	in	 the	 last	 three	 decades	 has	 narrowed	 Congress’s	 commerce	power	 by	 requiring	 that	 the	 regulated	 activity	 be	 “economic	 in	nature”	 for	 the	 law	 to	 find	 justification	 under	 the	 Commerce	Clause.30	 The	 court	 in	Nagarwala	 reasoned	 that	 since	 FGM	 is	 a	“form	of	physical	assault”	and	not	an	“[illegal]	healthcare	service,”	it	 is	 not	 “economic	 in	 nature,”	 and	 the	 federal	 ban	 is	 an	unconstitutional	 overstep	 of	 Congress’s	 Commerce	 Clause	authority.31	The	DOJ	initially	appealed	the	District	Court’s	decision	to	the	US	Circuit	Court	for	the	Sixth	Circuit	in	2018,32	but	informed	the	US	Senate	(the	“Senate”)	that	it	would	withdraw	from	its	appeal	in	an	April	10,	2019	letter.33	The	letter	explains	that	the	DOJ	“reluctantly	concluded”	 that	 it	 had	 no	 reasonable	 defense	 of	 the	 FGM	 Act	provision.34	 In	 response,	 the	 US	 House	 of	 Representatives	 (the	“House”)	moved	to	intervene	and	argue	the	constitutionality	of	the	FGM	Act	on	appeal.35	After	 the	House’s	motion	 to	 intervene,	 the	DOJ	opposed	the	motion	by	moving	to	withdraw	its	appeal,	which	
                                                        28.	 Id.	at	629-30.	29.	 See	United	States	v.	Durham,	902	F.3d	1180,	1200	(10th	Cir.	2018)	 (“Between	1937	 and	 1995,	 the	 Court	 did	 not	 invalidate	 one	 federal	 law	 under	 the	 [Interstate	Commerce	Clause]”);	ERWIN	CHEMERINSKY,	CONSTITUTIONAL	LAW	§	3.4.4	(5th	ed.	2015).	30.	 See	United	States	v.	Lopez,	514	U.S.	549,	560-61	(1995)	(holding	that	the	Gun-Free	School	Zone	Act’s	 federal	ban	on	possessing	a	 firearm	near	a	 school	zone	exceeds	Congress’s	 commerce	 power,	 since	 “mere	 possession”	 of	 a	 firearm	 is	 not	 an	 economic	activity);	see	also	United	States	v.	Morrison,	529	U.S.	598,	613	(2000)	 (holding	 that	 the	Violence	 Against	Women	 Act’s	 creation	 of	 a	 federal	 cause	 of	 action	 for	 sexual	 assault	victims	 exceeds	 Congress’s	 commerce	 power,	 since	 sexual	 assault	 is	 not	 “economic	 in	nature”).	31.		Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	630.	32.	Notice	of	Appeal,	United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	No.	19-1015	(6th	Cir.	 filed	 Jan.	3,	2019);	Rice,	supra	note	11.	33.	 Letter	 from	 Noel	 J.	 Franisco,	 Solicitor	 General	 of	 the	 United	 States	 to	 Diane	Feinstein,	 Ranking	Member	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 the	 Judiciary,	 DEP’T	 OF	 JUST.	 (Apr.	 10,	2019),	 https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/osg-530d-letters/4_10_2019/download	[https://perma.cc/TY9W-X3VF].	34.	 Id.	35.	 Reply	 Brief	 in	 Support	 of	 Motion	 of	 the	 U.S.	 House	 of	 Representatives	 to	Intervene,	United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	No.	19-1015	(6th	Cir.	filed	June	7,	2019),	available	
at	 https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2019/06/Nagarwala-Reply-Brief-in-Support-of-Motion-to-Intervene.pdf	[https://perma.cc/7KFF-BC4L].	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1301	was	granted	by	the	court.36	Daniel	Rice,	counsel	for	the	House	for	its	motion	to	intervene,	has	suggested	that	the	DOJ	did	“everything	in	its	power”	to	prevent	a	constitutional	defense	of	the	FGM	Act	by	withdrawing	and	opposing	the	motion	to	intervene.37	Part	 II	 of	 this	 Note	 will	 provide	 a	 brief	 explanation	 of	 the	international	 prevalence	 of	 FGM,	 and	 discuss	 its	 spread	 to	 the	United	States.	Part	III	will	explain	the	Nagarwala	Court’s	holding	that	 the	 FGM	 Act	 exceeds	 Congress’s	 authority	 under	 the	Commerce	 Clause.	 Part	 III	 will	 suggest	 that	 Judge	 Friedman’s	Commerce	Clause	holding	correctly	applies	United	States	v.	Lopez	and	 United	 States	 v.	 Morrison’s	 narrow	 Commerce	 Clause	interpretation	requiring	the	regulated	activity	to	be	“economic	in	nature.”	Part	 IV	 will	 address	 the	 Nagarwala	 Court’s	 treaty	interpretation	of	the	ICCPR.	The	Note	will	first	explain	Congress’s	authority	under	Missouri	v.	Holland	to	pass	legislation	“necessary	and	proper”	to	implement	treaties,	even	if	the	legislation	exceeds	Congress’s	 commerce	 power.	 Next,	 the	 Note	will	 argue	 that	 the	
Nagarwala	 Court	 correctly	 concluded	 that	 the	 FGM	ban	 is	 not	 a	valid	 implementation	 of	 ICCPR	 Article	 3.	With	 respect	 to	 ICCPR	Article	 24,	 Part	 IV	 will	 suggest	 that	 Judge	 Friedman’s	 analysis	neglected	 to	 consult	 extra-textual	 sources	 usually	 employed	 in	treaty	 interpretation.	 Finally,	 Part	 IV	will	 suggest	 that	 Congress	might	justify	the	FGM	Act	under	its	treaty-implementing	power	if	the	United	States	were	to	ratify	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	all	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	(“CEDAW”),	a	treaty	the	United	States	has	signed	but	not	ratified.	
II.	INTERNATIONAL	AND	DOMESTIC	PREVALENCE	OF	FGM	Although	the	precise	origin	of	FGM	is	unknown,	the	practice	is	most	prevalent	in	parts	of	Africa,	the	Middle	East,	and	Southeast	Asia.38	Initially,	the	United	Nations	and	World	Health	Organization	referred	to	the	dangerous	practice	as	“female	circumcision”	in	its	studies.39	Since	the	1990s,	however,	the	practice	has	widely	been	known	as	 “female	 genital	mutilation.”40	 Some	advocates	of	 FGM,	
                                                        36.	 Rice,	supra	note	11.	37.	 Id.	38.	 Llamas,	supra	note	3;	Jones	et	al.,	supra	note	3,	at	370.	39.	 Llamas,	supra	note	3.	40.	 Id.	
1302	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	usually	from	the	areas	in	which	the	practice	is	prevalent,	prefer	the	name	 “circumcision”	 to	 “mutilation”	 due	 to	 its	 religious	 and	cultural	significance.41	UNICEF	estimates	that	FGM	is	almost	a	universal	practice	in	Somalia,	Guinea,	and	Yemen,	with	rates	around	ninety	percent.42	Although	a	majority	of	women	in	most	countries	in	Africa	and	the	Middle	East	think	the	practice	should	end,	over	half	of	the	female	population	in	Mali,	Sierra	Leone,	Guinea,	the	Gambia,	Somalia,	and	Egypt	thinks	the	practice	should	continue.43	The	justifications	for	FGM	 vary	 from	 culture	 to	 culture,	 but	 it	 is	 often	 performed	 to	preserve	virginity,	improve	hygiene,	engage	in	religious	tradition,	or	 serve	 as	 a	 cultural	 “rite	 of	 passage.”44	 The	 World	 Health	Organization	 has	 recognized	 that	 older	 women	 who	 have	undergone	FGM	“often	become	gatekeepers	of	the	practice”	in	their	communities,	 which	 entails	 preparing	 females	 for	 FGM,	performing	 FGM,	 and	 punishing	 females	who	 refuse	 to	 undergo	FGM.45	Although	international	FGM	rates	have	declined	over	the	last	three	decades,46	the	practice	has	spread	to	areas	of	Australia,	North	America,	and	Europe,	corresponding	to	the	frequency	of	migrants	from	the	countries	where	FGM	is	prevalent.47	A	2013	study	found	that	in	the	United	States,	approximately	500,000	women	and	girls	are	victims	of	FGM,	or	are	at	risk	of	FGM.48	California,	New	York,	and	Minnesota	 have	 the	most	 FGM	 victims	 or	 people	 at	 risk	 of	FGM,49	and	FGM	is	most	prevalent	in	urban	centers	of	the	United	States	like	New	York,	Washington,	D.C.,	Minneapolis,	Los	Angeles,	
                                                        41.	 Jones	et	al.,	supra	note	3,	at	370.	42.	 Female	 genital	 mutilation	 (FGM),	 UNICEF	 DATA	 (Feb.	 2020),	https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/female-genital-mutilation/	[https://perma.cc/6GHL-P8MJ]	 [hereinafter	UNICEF];	 see	Michelle	Krupa,	The	alarming	
rise	 of	 female	 genital	 mutilation	 in	 America,	 CNN	 HEALTH	 (July	 14,	 2017,	 10:06	 AM),	https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/health/female-genital-mutilation-fgm-explainer-trnd/index.html	[https://perma.cc/9SUC-YG96].	43.	 UNICEF,	supra	note	42.	44.	 Jones	et	al.,	supra	note	3,	at	370.	45.	 Christopher	J.	Coyne	&	Rachel	L.	Coyne,	The	Identity	Economics	of	Female	Genital	
Mutilation,	48	J.	DEVELOPING	AREAS	137,	139,	146	(2014).	46.	 UNICEF,	supra	note	42.	47.	 Id.;	Goldberg	et	al.,	supra	note	4.	48.	 Population	Reference	Bureau	[PRB],	U.S.	Women	and	Girls	Potentially	at	Risk	for	
FGM/C,	 by	 State,	 2013	 Preliminary	 Data,	 PRB	 (2013),	 https://assets.prb.org/pdf15/us-fgmc-all-states-table.pdf	[https://perma.cc/M7FA-Z695].	49.	 Id.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1303	and	 Seattle.50	 A	 Centers	 for	 Disease	 Control	 (the	 “CDC”)	 study	found	an	increase	in	FGM	rates	in	the	United	States	between	1990-2000,51	which	reiterates	the	notion	that	the	increase	is	a	result	of	rapid	growth	in	numbers	of	immigrants	from	countries	where	FGM	is	prevalent	during	those	years.52	
III.	THE	FGM	ACT	EXCEEDS	CONGRESS’S	COMMERCE	POWER	
UNDER	LOPEZ	AND	MORRISON	This	section	will	suggest	that	the	Nagarwala	Court’s	holding	that	 the	FGM	Act	exceeds	Congress’s	Commerce	Power	seems	to	correctly	 apply	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 narrow	 reading	 of	 the	Commerce	 Clause	 in	 Lopez	 and	 Morrison,	 contrary	 to	 the	arguments	of	the	government,53	Daniel	Rice,54	and	women’s	rights	group	AHA	Foundation55	(whether	the	narrow	Commerce	Clause	interpretation	in	Lopez	and	Morrison	 is	convincing	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Note).	Article	1,	Section	8,	Clause	3	of	the	United	States	Constitution	(the	 “Commerce	 Clause”)	 authorizes	 Congress	 “to	 regulate	Commerce	with	foreign	Nations,	and	among	the	several	States,	and	with	 Indian	 Tribes.”56	 For	 most	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	Supreme	 Court’s	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	allowed	Congress	wide	regulatory	authority.	Between	1937-1995,	the	Supreme	Court	consistently	upheld	Congressional	 legislation	under	 a	 lenient	 test,	 57	where	 Congress	 had	 the	 authority	 to	 (1)	regulate	 interstate	 travel,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 law	 does	 not	 violate	
                                                        50.	 Ranit	Mishori	et	al.,	Female	Genital	Mutilation	or	Cutting,	AM.	FAM.	PHYSICIAN	(Jan.	1,	 2018),	 https://www.aafp.org/afp/2018/0101/p49.html	 [https://perma.cc/CT9F-XYU8].	51.	 Goldberg	et	al.,	supra	note	4.	52.	 Id.	53.	 United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613,	617–18	(E.D.	Mich.	2018).	54.	 Rice,	supra	note	11.	55.	 Brief	of	Amicus	Curiae	AHA	Foundation	in	Support	of	the	United	States	of	America	at	9–14,	United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613	(E.D.	Mich.	2018)	(No.	18-mc-51358).	56.	 U.S.	CONST.	art.	1,	§	8,	cl.	3	[hereinafter	Commerce	Clause].	57.	 See,	e.g.,	NLRB	v.	Jones	&	Laughlin	Steel	Corp.,	301	U.S.	1,	37	(1937);	United	States	v.	Darby,	312	U.S.	100	 (1941);	Wickard	v.	Fillburn,	317	U.S.	111	 (1942);	Katzenbach	v.	McClung,	379	U.S.	294	(1964);	Heart	of	Atlanta	Motel,	Inc.	v.	United	States,	379	U.S.	241	(1964).	
1304	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	another	 Constitutional	 provision,58	 and	 (2)	 regulate	 any	 activity	having	a	close	or	substantial	relationship	to,	or	effect	on	interstate	commerce.59	 The	 second	 category	 of	 commerce	 power	 was	especially	 broad,	 since	 the	 relationship	 to	 interstate	 commerce	could	be	merely	 theoretical.60	Under	 this	 standard,	 the	Supreme	Court	 did	 not	 find	 a	 single	 federal	 law	 to	 exceed	 Congress’s	Commerce	Clause	authority	from	1937-1995.61	
A.	The	Supreme	Court	Reigns	in	the	Commerce	Power	in	Lopez	and	
Morrison	In	1995,	the	Supreme	Court	in	Lopez	held	that	a	provision	of	the	Gun-Free	School	Zone	Act	of	1990,	banning	the	possession	of	firearms	near	school	zones,	exceeded	Congress’	power	under	the	Commerce	 Clause.62	 Justice	 Rehnquist’s	 majority	 opinion	identified	three	separate	categories	of	activity	which	Congress	has	the	authority	to	regulate	under	the	Commerce	Clause	(the	Lopez	Court	 divided	 the	 first	 traditional	 commerce	 category	 described	above	into	two	distinct	categories):63	First,	 Congress	 may	 regulate	 the	 use	 of	 the	 channels	 of	interstate	 commerce.	Second,	 Congress	 is	 empowered	 to	regulate	 and	 protect	 the	 instrumentalities	 of	 interstate	commerce,	or	persons	or	things	in	interstate	commerce,	even	though	 the	 threat	 may	 come	 only	 from	 intrastate	
                                                        58.	 See	Thomson	v.	Union	Pacific	R.R.,	76	U.S.	 (9	Wall.)	 579,	19	L.Ed.	792	 (1870);	Luxton	v.	North	River	Bridge	Co.,	153	U.S.	525,	14	S.	Ct.	891,	38	L.Ed.	808	(1894);	1	TREATISE	ON	CONST.	L.	§	4.8(a)	(explaining	that	 this	 first	category	authorizes	Congress	 to	regulate	essentially	anything	or	anyone	which	crosses	state	lines)	[hereinafter	Modern	Commerce	Power	Tests].	59.	 Complete	Auto	Transit,	Inc.	v.	Brady,	430	U.S.	274,	97	S.Ct.	1076,	51	L.Ed.2d	326	(1977);	Modern	Commerce	Power	Tests,	supra	note	58,	§	4.8(a).	60.	 See	Wickard,	317	U.S.	111	(holding	that	a	federal	wheat	quota	applied	to	a	farmer	was	justified	under	the	Commerce	Clause,	even	though	the	farmer	grew	the	wheat	for	self-consumption	 and	 not	 for	 sale.	 The	 court	 reasoned	 that	 theoretically,	 many	 farmers	growing	wheat	for	self-consumption	could	affect	the	supply	and	demand	for	wheat,	which	could	affect	interstate	commerce);	Heart	of	Atlanta	Motel,	Inc.,	379	U.S.	241	(holding	that	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1964	provision	banning	discrimination	at	private	businesses	was	a	valid	 exercise	of	Congress’	Commerce	Power,	 since	discrimination	at	businesses	would	theoretically	affect	people’s	interstate	travel	destinations,	and	the	places	travelers	would	spend	money);	§	4.8(a)Modern	Commerce	Power	Tests,	supra	note	58.	61.	 See	 United	 States	 v.	 Durham,	 902	 F.3d	 1180,	 1200	 (10th	 Cir.	 2018);	CHEMERINSKY,	supra	note	29,	§	3.4.4.	62.	 United	States	v.	Lopez,	514	U.S.	549,	567-68	(1995).	63.	 Modern	Commerce	Power	Tests,	supra	note	58,	§	4.8(a).	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1305	activities.	Finally,	Congress’	commerce	authority	includes	the	power	to	regulate	those	activities	having	a	substantial	relation	to	interstate	commerce,	i.e.,	those	activities	that	substantially	affect	interstate	commerce.64	Only	 the	 third	category	of	 commerce	power	was	at	 issue	 in	
Lopez,65	and	it	was	the	only	category	at	issue	in	Nagarwala.66	The	
Lopez	 majority	 articulated	 the	 rule	 for	 Congressional	 authority	under	this	third	category:	first,	the	regulated	activity	must	have	a	“substantial	 effect”	 on	 interstate	 commerce.67	 Second,	 the	 Court	will	give	less	deference	to	federal	legislation	if	it	does	not	regulate	“economic	 activity.”68	 This	 “economic	 activity”	 prong	 is	particularly	 relevant	 for	 the	Nagarwala	 Court’s	 rejection	 of	 the	FGM	Act.69	With	 respect	 to	 the	 first	 prong,	 the	 Court	 rejected	 the	government’s	argument	that	gun	possession	in	school	zones	might	affect	interstate	commerce,	since	gun	violence	takes	a	toll	on	the	national	 economy.70	 Justice	 Rehnquist	 explained	 that	 allowing	Congress	to	regulate	activity	with	such	a	tenuous	relationship	to	interstate	 commerce	would	 allow	 Congress	 to	 regulate	 virtually	any	activity.71	Under	the	second	prong,	the	Lopez	Court	held	that	possession	of	guns	near	school	zones	is	“in	no	sense	an	economic	activity,”	rendering	this	provision	of	the	Gun-Free	School	Zone	Act	outside	 of	 Congress’	 commerce	 power.72	 Although	 Justice	Kennedy’s	Lopez	concurrence	indicates	that	a	majority	of	justices	thought	 this	 “economic	 activity”	 holding	 was	 not	 a	 rejection	 of	
                                                        64.	 Lopez,	514	U.S.	at	558-59.	65.	 Id.	at	559.	66.	 United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613,	622	(E.D.	Mich.	2018).	67.	 See	Lopez,	514	U.S.	at	557,	563;	Modern	Commerce	Power	Tests,	supra	note	58,	§	4.8(a)	(Although	the	“substantial	effect”	language	used	by	the	Lopez	majority	is	consistent	with	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 precedent	 from	 1937-1995,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	commerce	 cases	 prior	 to	 Lopez	 are	 more	 accurately	 interpreted	 as	 requiring	 an	“insignificant	 or	 trivial”	 effect	 on	 interstate	 commerce);	 Deborah	 Jones	Merritt,	Commerce!,	94	MICH.	L.	REV.	674,	677	(1995).	68.	 Lopez,	514	U.S.	at	560	(“Where	economic	activity	substantially	affects	interstate	commerce,	 legislation	 regulating	 that	 activity	 will	 be	 sustained.”);	 Modern	 Commerce	Power	Tests,	supra	note	58,	§	4.8(a).	69.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	627.	70.	 Lopez,	514	U.S.	at	563-64.	71.	 Id.	at	564.	72.	 Id.	at	567.	
1306	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	Commerce	Clause	precedent,73	this	narrow	reading	requiring	the	regulated	 activity	 to	 be	 “commercial	 in	 nature”74	 is	 seen	 as	 a	dramatic	shift	in	the	Supreme	Court’s	federalism	jurisprudence.75	After	Lopez,	 the	Congressionally	regulated	activity	must	not	only	have	 a	 theoretical	 impact	 on	 interstate	 commerce—there	 must	also	be	something	about	the	activity	that	is	intrinsically	economic.76	Five	years	 later,	 the	Supreme	Court	applied	Lopez’s	narrow	Commerce	 Clause	 interpretation	 in	Morrison.77	 In	Morrison,	 the	Court	struck	down	a	provision	of	the	Violence	Against	Women	Act	(“VAWA”)	 granting	 women	 a	 federal	 cause	 of	 action	 for	 sexual	assault.78	 The	 Court	 held	 that	 “[g]ender-motivated	 crimes	 of	violence	are	not,	in	any	sense	of	the	phrase,	economic	activity.”79	Although	violence	against	women	would	likely	satisfy	the	lenient	“aggregate	effect	on	interstate	commerce”	prong,80	the	Court	held	that	 it	 is	 not	 an	 intrinsically	 commercial	 activity	 under	 Lopez.81	After	Lopez	and	Morrison,	an	activity	must	be	“economic	in	nature”	for	Congress	to	be	able	to	regulate	it	under	the	commerce	power.82	
B.	Nagarwala’s	Commerce	Clause	Interpretation:	FGM	is	not	
“Economic	in	Nature”	In	Nagarwala,	Judge	Friedman	applied	the	narrow	“economic	in	nature”	standard	 from	Lopez	and	Morrison	 to	strike	down	the	Congressional	 criminalization	 of	 FGM.83	 First,	 the	 government	argued	that	the	FGM	Act	is	within	Congress’	commerce	power	by	
                                                        73.	 Id.	at	574	(Kennedy,	 J.,	concurring)	(citing	the	country’s	“immense	stake	 in	the	stability	of	our	Commerce	Clause	jurisprudence”);	see	generally	3	WILLIAM	J.	RICH,	MODERN	CONSTITUTIONAL	LAW	§	35:6	(3d	ed.	2011).	74.	 Id.	at	627	(Breyer,	J.,	dissenting).	75.	 Id.	 at	 628–29	 (“The	 second	 legal	 problem	 the	 Court	 creates	 comes	 from	 its	apparent	 belief	 that	 it	 can	 reconcile	 its	 holding	with	 earlier	 cases	 by	making	 a	 critical	distinction	between	‘commercial’	and	noncommercial	“transaction[s]”).	76.	 David	 M.	 Driesen,	 The	 Economic/Nonecononic	 Activity	 Distinction	 Under	 the	
Commerce	Clause,	67	CASE	W.	RES.	L.	REV.337,	344-45	(2016).	77.	 United	States	v.	Morrison,	529	U.S.	598,	613	(2000).	78.	 Id.	at	598,	627.	79.	 Id.	at	613.	80.	 Id.	at	610.	81.	 Id.	 at	 634	 (Souter,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (citing	 a	 Congressional	 finding	 that	 gender-motivated	 violence	 impacts	 interstate	 commerce	 by	 “deterring	 potential	 victims	 from	traveling	 interstate,	 from	 engaging	 in	 employment	 in	 interstate	 business,	 and	 from	transacting	with	business,	and	in	places	involved,	in	interstate	commerce”).	82.	 Id.	at	613.	83.	 United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613,	627-28	(E.D.	Mich.	2018).	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1307	attempting	to	emphasize	the	existence	of	an	interstate	market	for	FGM.84	The	court	explained	that	the	government	failed	to	show	that	such	a	market	exists,	holding	that	FGM	was	a	“purely	local”	crime	in	 the	 realm	 of	 state	 authority.”85	 Next,	 the	 court	 rejected	 the	government’s	argument	that	FGM	is	an	“illegal	form	of	healthcare,”	where	healthcare	is	considered	an	intrinsically	economic	activity	within	 Congress’	 commerce	 power.86	 The	 court	 explained	 that	“FGM	 is	 a	 form	 of	 physical	 assault,	 not	 anything	 approaching	 a	healthcare	service.”87	 Judge	Friedman	analogized	the	FGM	Act	 to	the	 Gun-Free	 School	 Zone	 Act	 in	 Lopez	 by	 suggesting	 that	performing	 FGM,	 like	 possessing	 a	 gun	 in	 a	 school	 zone,	 is	 a	“criminal	act	that	‘has	nothing	to	do	with	commerce	or	any	sort	of	economic	enterprise.’”88	
C.	Criticism	of	the	Nagarwala	Opinion	The	Nagarwala	 Court’s	 Commerce	 Clause	 holding	 was	met	with	 criticism	 by	 legal	 scholars	 and	 women’s	 rights	 activists.	Daniel	 Rice89	 argues	 that	 the	 Nagarwala	 Court	 misapplied	 the	language	from	Bond	v.	United	States,	which	suggests	that	Congress	cannot	regulate	“purely	local”	crimes	under	its	commerce	power,	which	are	 left	 to	 the	authority	of	 the	states.90	He	suggests	 that	a	relevant	consideration	in	determining	whether	a	crime	is	“purely	local”	is	“whether	the	international	community	has	condemned	the	relevant	practice	and	joined	together	to	eradicate	it.”91	Daniel	Rice	points	 to	 statements	 from	 the	 United	 Nations,	 the	 Trump	Administration,	 US	 Immigration	 and	 Customs	 Enforcement	(“ICE”),	the	DOJ,	and	others	condemning	FGM	and	recognizing	it	as	a	 great	 international	 concern.92	 Further,	 he	 points	 out	 that	 FGM	often	occurs	“transnationally,”	as	FGM	performers	and	victims	are	often	transported	for	the	procedure,	as	in	Nagarwala.93	For	these	
                                                        84.	 Id.	at	627.	85.	 Id.	86.	 Id.	at	628.	87.	 Id.	(emphasis	added).	88.	 Id.	at	628	(citing	United	States	v.	Lopez,	514	U.S.	549,	561	(1995)).	89.	 Counsel	for	the	House	in	its	motion	to	intervene	in	the	Nagarwala	appeal.	90.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	619-20	(quoting	Bond	v.	United	States,	572	U.S.	844,	856	(2014)).	91.	 Rice,	supra	note	11.	92.	 Id.	93.	 Id.	
1308	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	reasons,	Daniel	Rice	disagrees	with	the	Nagarwala	Court’s	holding	that	FGM	is	a	“purely	local”	crime	in	the	realm	of	state	authority.94	Although	 Daniel	 Rice	 presents	 a	 convincing	 argument	 that	FGM	cannot	be	considered	a	“purely	local”	activity,	the	argument	fails	 to	address	 the	major	consideration	of	Lopez	 and	Morrison’s	Commerce	 Clause	 analysis—the	 “economic	 in	 nature”	 prong.	Daniel	Rice	briefly	addresses	the	economic	ramifications	of	FGM,	correctly	 suggesting	 that	 medical	 complications	 caused	 by	 FGM	take	a	toll	on	the	national	economy	by	increasing	healthcare	costs,	and	 that	 FGM	 providers	 are	 often	 compensated.95	 This	 point,	however,	only	seems	to	establish	the	lenient	Commerce	Clause	test	used	before	Lopez,	requiring	only	that	the	regulated	activity	have	an	 impact	 on	 interstate	 commerce	 in	 the	 aggregate.96	 After	 the	narrow	interpretation	of	Lopez	and	Morrison,	the	regulated	activity	must	 also	 be	 “economic	 in	 nature.”97	 Examining	 the	 economic	impact	of	FGM	is	not	enough	after	Lopez	and	Morrison.	Now,	the	court	 must	 also	 find	 something	 intrinsically	 economic	 or	commercial	about	the	activity	for	Congress	to	have	the	authority	to	regulate	the	activity	under	the	Commerce	Clause.	The	 AHA	 Foundation	 (“AHA”)	 submitted	 an	 amicus	 curiae	brief	in	Nagarwala	which	more	directly	addresses	the	“economic	in	 nature”	 prong,	 though	 it	 ultimately	 fails	 to	 demonstrate	 that	FGM	is	inherently	“economic”	or	“commercial”	under	the	narrow	interpretation	 of	 Lopez	 and	Morrison,	 and	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	characterization	of	“economics.”98	AHA	first	points	out	that	FGM	is	“generally	bought	and	paid	for.”99	They	cite	findings	that	families	often	 pool	 resources	 to	 pay	 for	 a	 provider	 to	 perform	 FGM	 on	groups	of	girls,	and	that	many	FGM	providers	perform	FGM	as	their	source	 of	 livelihood.100	 The	 government’s	 brief	 in	 Nagarwala	makes	a	similar	attempt	to	characterize	FGM	as	economic,	pointing	out	 that	 Dr.	 Nagarwala’s	 FGM	 in	 Michigan	 was	 performed	 with	“commercially-sold	 medical	 tools	 and	 supplies.”101	 AHA	 also	
                                                        94.	 Id.	95.	 Id.	96.	 See	Wickard	v.	Filburn,	317	U.S.	111	(1942).	97.	 United	States	v.	Morrison,	529	U.S.	598,	613	(2000).	98.	 Brief	of	Amicus	Curiae	AHA	Foundation	in	Support	of	the	United	States	of	America	at	1,	United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613	(E.D.	Mich.	2018)	(No.	18-mc-51358).	99.	 Id.	at	12.	100.	 Id.	at	12-13.	101.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	628.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1309	supports	the	economic	nature	of	FGM	by	pointing	out	that	in	some	cultures,	 the	 practice	 is	 used	 for	 the	 “insidious”	 purpose	 of	increasing	 the	 desirability	 of	 an	 FGM	 victim	 as	 a	 bride,	 which	increases	the	“bride	price”	for	the	victim’s	family	upon	marriage.102	Although	these	are	circumstances	where	FGM	could	relate	to	an	economic	transaction,	AHA’s	argument	does	not	establish	that	FGM	meets	Lopez	and	Morrison’s	both	high	and	narrow	standard	of	“economic	 in	 nature.”103	 In	 Lopez,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 seems	 to	reason	that	although	gun	possession	in	a	school	zone	could	be	part	of	 an	 economic	 transaction	 (the	 defendant	 in	 Lopez	 actually	brought	 the	 gun	 to	 his	 school	 to	 sell	 for	US$40),	 the	 dispositive	question	 is	 whether	 the	 activity	 is	 inherently	 economic	 or	commercial104—whether	 it	 is	 an	 activity	 inextricably	 linked	 to	economic	activity.	
D.	Transaction-Based	Commerce	Clause	“Economics”	After	Lopez	
and	Morrison	To	 determine	 whether	 FGM	 meets	 this	 standard,	 it	 is	necessary	to	examine	the	meaning	of	“economic”	or	“commercial”	in	the	Commerce	Clause	context.	The	Lopez	Court	did	not	articulate	a	 precise	 test	 for	 its	 distinction	 between	 “commercial”	 and	“noncommercial”	activity,105	nor	did	the	Morrison	Court	define	its	phrase	 “economic	 in	 nature.”106	 This	 lack	 of	 clarity	 could	 leave	judges	 susceptible	 to	 applying	 their	 personal	 conceptions	 of	“economics”	in	Commerce	Clause	challenges.107	Judge	 Richard	 Posner,	 a	 major	 figure	 in	 the	 Law	 and	Economics	movement,	broadly	defines	“economics”	as	“the	science	of	rational	choice	in	a	world	-	our	world	-	in	which	resources	are	limited	in	relation	to	human	wants.”108	Author	Scott	Powers	makes	
                                                        102.	 Brief	 of	 Amicus	 Curiae	 AHA	 Foundation	 in	 Support	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	America	at	13,	United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613	(E.D.	Mich.	2018)	(No.	18-mc-51358).	103.	 United	States	v.	Morrison,	529	U.S.	598,	613	(2000).	104.	 Michael	 E.	 Rosman,	 Facial	 Challenges	 and	 the	 Commerce	 Clause:	 Rethinking	
Lopez	and	Morrison,	4	FAULKNER	L.	REV.	1,	21-22	(2012).	105.	 United	States	v.	Lopez,	514	U.S.	549,	566	(1995).	106.	 Morrison,	529	U.S.	at	613.	107.		Scott	T.	Powers,	Commerce—A	Retreat	from	Clarity:	The	Supreme	Court	Adds	a	
Wrinkle	to	the	“Aggregated	Effects”	Doctrine	of	its	Commerce	Clause	Jurisprudence—United	
States	v.	Morrison,	519	U.S.	598	(2000),	75	TEMPLE	L.	REV.	163,	194-96	(2002).	108.	 Id.	at	196.	
1310	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	the	point	that	under	this	broad	definition,	the	assault	of	a	woman	in	Morrison	 or	 possession	 of	 a	 gun	 in	 Lopez	 would	 certainly	 be	inherently	 economic.109	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 perpetrators	 made	choices	 to	 “[expend]	 personal	 resources”	 to	 satisfy	 personal	“wants,”	which	satisfies	Judge	Posner’s	broad	definition.110	The	fact	that	 the	 Court	 in	 Lopez	 and	 Morrison	 determined	 that	 gun	possession	 and	 the	 assault	 of	 a	 woman	 are	 not	 “economic	 in	nature”	 (or	 “noncommercial”)	 suggests	 that	 the	 Court	 did	 not	accept	 Judge	 Posner’s	 broad	 view	 in	 Commerce	 Clause	 cases.	Alternatively,	 economist	 Ronald	 Coase,	 creator	 of	 the	 “Coase	Theorem”	 in	 law	 and	 economics,111	 advocates	 a	 more	 limited	definition	 of	 “economics,”	 characterizing	 it	 as	 “only	 [the]	traditional	institutions	which	bind	together	our	economy,	such	as:	firms,	 markets	 for	 goods	 and	 services,	 labor	 markets,	 capital	markets,	the	banking	system	and	international	trade.”112	Regardless	of	which	view	of	“economics”	is	more	convincing,	the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 Commerce	 Clause	 jurisprudence	 is	 shifting	toward	Coase’s	more	limited,	transactional	definition.	In	Gonzales	
v.	Raich,	the	Court	considered	whether	Congress	has	the	authority	under	the	Commerce	Clause	to	pass	provisions	of	the	Controlled	Substances	Act	(“CSA”)	prohibiting	the	local	cultivation	and	use	of	marijuana.113	In	holding	that	Congress	could	regulate	this	activity	under	 its	 commerce	 power,	 Justice	 Stevens	 explained	 that	Congress	can	regulate	noneconomic	activity	by	passing	laws	which	are	“essential	[parts]	of	a	larger	regulation	of	economic	activity,	in	which	 the	 regulatory	 scheme	 could	 be	 undercut	 unless	 the	intrastate	activity	were	regulated.”114	In	other	words,	Congress	can	pass	laws	regulating	noneconomic	activity	if	the	law	is	part	of	an	“ambitious,	far-reaching	federal	regulation.”115	
                                                        109.	 Id.	at	195-96.	110.	 Id.	111.	 Steven	G.	Medema	&	Richard	O.	Zerbe,	Jr,	The	Coase	Theorem,	in	1	ENCYCLOPEDIA	OF	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS	836	(Boudewijn	Bouckaert	&	Gerrit	De	Geest,	eds.,	2000).	112.	 Ronald	H.	Coase,	Economics	and	Contiguous	Disciplines,	7	J.	LEGAL	STUD.	201,	206-07	(1978);	see	Powers,	supra	note	107,	at	194-96.	113.	 See	Gonzales	v.	Raich,	545	U.S.	1	(2005).	114.	 Id.	at	24.	115.	 Ann	Schober,	United	States	v.	Morrison	15	Years	Later:	How	the	Supreme	Court’s	
Disjointed	 Adjudication	 of	 Commerce	 Clause	 Legislation	 Opens	 A	 Back	Door	 to	 Restoring	
Federal	Civil	Recourse	for	Certain	Victims	of	Gender-Based	Violence,	34	J.	L.	&	COM.	161,	175	(2015).	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1311	In	his	discussion	of	“economics,”	Justice	Stevens	distinguished	marijuana	 production	 and	 use	 from	 the	 regulated	 activities	 in	
Lopez	and	Morrison:	Unlike	 those	 at	 issue	 in	Lopez	and	Morrison	 the	 activities	regulated	 by	 the	 CSA	 are	 quintessentially	 economic.	“Economics”	 refers	 to	 “the	 production,	 distribution,	 and	consumption	 of	 commodities.”	 Webster’s	 Third	 New	International	Dictionary	720	(1966).	The	CSA	is	a	statute	that	regulates	 the	 production,	 distribution,	 and	 consumption	 of	commodities	for	which	there	is	an	established,	and	lucrative,	interstate	market.116	Justice	 O’Connor,	 in	 her	 Gonzales	 dissent,	 argues	 that	 this	dictionary	definition	of	“economics”	is	too	broad.117	The	majority’s	focus	 on	 “production,	 distribution,	 and	 consumption	 of	commodities,”	 however,	 seems	 to	 fit	 with	 Coase’s	 limited	characterization	of	economics	involving	firms,	markets	for	goods	and	 services,	 and	 labor	markets	 –	 not	 Posner’s	 general	 view	 of	general	“choices”	in	the	face	of	limited	resources.118	FGM	thus	cannot	be	considered	“economic	in	nature”	under	the	 narrow	 standard	 of	Lopez	 and	Morrison,	 as	 informed	by	 the	“economics”	discussion	 in	Raich.	 First,	 the	 “nature”	of	FGM	does	not	 inherently	 involve	 the	 “production,	 distribution,	 [or]	consumption	 of	 commodities.”119	 As	 discussed,	 Lopez	 seems	 to	require	that	the	activity	be	inextricably	tied	to	economic	activity	–	in	other	words,	the	activity	cannot	occur	in	a	noneconomic	way	for	Congress	to	be	able	to	regulate	it	under	the	Commerce	Clause.120	AHA’s	suggestion	that	FGM	is	usually	performed	for	compensation,	and	 that	 it	often	used	 to	 increase	a	victim’s	 “bride	price”121	only	provides	 an	 example	 of	 when	 the	 practice	 can	 be	 tied	 to	 a	transactional	economic	exchange.	FGM	is	frequently	performed	in	
                                                        116.	 Raich,	545	U.S.	at	25-26.	117.	 Id.	at	49	(O’Connor,	J.,	dissenting)	(referring	to	the	majority’s	broad	definition	of	“economics”	as	“breathtaking”).	118.	 See	Coase,	supra	note	112.	119.	 Raich,	545	U.S.	at	25–26.	120.	 See	United	States	v.	Lopez,	514	U.S.	549,	566	(1995)	(holding	that	possession	of	a	gun	in	a	school	zone	is	a	noncommercial	activity	and	outside	Congress’	Commerce	Clause	authority,	even	though	the	gun	in	the	Lopez	case	was	brought	to	school	to	be	sold	for	$40).	121.	 Brief	 of	 Amicus	 Curiae	 AHA	 Foundation	 in	 Support	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	America	at	13,	United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613	(E.D.	Mich.	2018)	(No.	18-mc-51358).	
1312	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	the	home	by	family	members	or	neighbors,	a	gruesome	situation	in	which	compensation	is	unlikely.122	Further,	 although	 FGM	 is	 frequently	 used	 for	 the	 horrific	purpose	of	increasing	a	victim’s	“bride	price”	(which	likely	fits	with	
Raich’s	transactional,	commodity-based	approach	to	“economics”),	increasing	bride	price	is	not	a	purpose	inherently	tied	to	FGM.	The	United	 Nations	 Population	 Fund	 (the	 “UNPF”)	 lists	 other	prominent	 purposes	 for	 FGM	 besides	 increasing	 the	 marriage	“value”	 of	 a	 victim,	 where	 these	 purposes	 vary	 by	 culture	 and	religion,	and	can	exist	independently	of	each	other.123	Additionally,	many	 cultures	 perform	 FGM	 under	 the	 mistaken	 idea	 that	 it	improves	hygiene,	or	“aesthetic	appeal.”124	FGM	is	also	performed	in	some	cultures	for	the	purpose	of	adhering	to	religious	doctrine	requiring	the	practice,125	and	some	cultures	see	FGM	as	a	method	of	preserving	virginity	before	marriage.126	Although	attempts	to	improve	hygiene	and	aesthetics,	adhere	to	religious	doctrine,	and	attempts	to	preserve	virginity	could	be	seen	 as	 “economic”	 activities	 under	 Judge	 Posner’s	 broad	definition,	they	do	not	fit	the	limited	transactional	definition	used	in	Raich’s	Commerce	Clause	discussion.	It	is	difficult	to	conceive	of	a	 practice	 performed	 for	 religious	 beliefs	 (in	 the	 home,	without	compensation)	as	 related	 to	 some	kind	of	market	 transaction	or	“commodity.”	The	possibility	of	FGM	being	performed	without	any	connection	to	“economics”	as	characterized	by	Raich	suggests	that	
                                                        122.	 Immigr.	 &	 Refugee	 Board	 of	 Can.,	 Somalia:	 Information	 on	 female	 genital	mutilation	in	Somalia,	on	the	methods	used	in	various	regions	and	on	the	consequences	of	refusal;	also,	information	on	the	presence	in	Somalia	of	women’s	organizations	concerned	with	 this	 issue,	 REFWORLD	 (Sept.	 1,	 1996),	https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaab44.html	 [https://perma.cc/W32J-GV84];	Delegation	of	the	Eur.	Union	to	Guinea,	Female	Genital	Mutilation…	EU	resolute	to	end	this	
torture!	 (Feb.	 6,	 2019),	 https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/guinea/57697/female-genital-mutilation%E2%80%A6-eu-resolute-end-torture_az	 [https://perma.cc/4D8Y-WVQU].	123.	 See	 U.N.	 Population	 Fund,	 Female	 genital	 mutilation	 (FGM)	 frequently	 asked	
questions,	U.N.	POPULATION	FUND	 (July	2019),	https://www.unfpa.org/resources/female-genital-mutilation-fgm-frequently-asked-questions#	 [https://perma.cc/SC89-NFMU]	[hereinafter	 U.N.	 Population	 Fund];	 G.A.	 Res.,	 supra	 note	 1	 (stating	 that	 “[w]here	 it	 is	believed	that	being	cut	 increases	marriageability,	FGM	is	more	likely	to	be	carried	out.”	This	implies	that	FGM	is	not	used	to	increase	marriageability	in	all	cultures,	or	in	every	instance).	124.	 U.N.	Population	Fund,	supra	note	123.	125.	 Id.	126.	 Id.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1313	it	is	not	inherently	“economic	in	nature,”	since	Lopez	suggests	that	an	activity	cannot	fall	under	Congress’s	Commerce	power	if	it	can	be	performed	in	a	noneconomic	way.127	
IV.	CONGRESSIONAL	AUTHORITY	TO	PASS	TREATY-
IMPLEMENTING	LEGISLATION	AS	A	BASIS	FOR	CRIMINALIZING	
FGM	Under	Missouri	v.	Holland,	Congress	has	the	authority	to	pass	legislation	“necessary	and	proper”	for	implementing	a	treaty,	even	if	 the	 legislation	 regulates	 an	 activity	 outside	 Congress’s	Commerce	 Power.128	 This	 Section	 will	 first	 explain	 Congress’	treaty-implementing	 power	 under	 Holland,	 and	 illustrate	 its	application	by	showing	how	Congress	might	have	the	authority	to	criminalize	violence	against	women	if	CEDAW	were	ratified.	Next,	this	 Section	will	 explain	 the	Nagarwala	 Court’s	 holding	 that	 the	FGM	Act	is	not	a	valid	exercise	of	Congress’	treaty-implementing	power	(in	Nagarwala,	the	treaty	at	issue	is	the	ICCPR).	This	Section	will	point	out	that	Daniel	Rice	makes	a	strong	case	that	the	District	Court	ignored	Supreme	Court	precedent	requiring	a	broad	inquiry	of	 treaty	 interpretation	tools	beyond	the	plain	text	of	 the	ICCPR.	The	Section	will	conclude	by	pointing	out	that	the	United	States’	ratification	of	CEDAW	would	likely	give	Congress	a	basis	to	pass	the	FGM	Act	under	its	treaty-implementing	power.	
A.	Congress’	Treaty-Implementing	Power	as	Authority	for	
Legislation	The	 Tenth	 Amendment	 to	 the	 US	 Constitution	 states	 that	“[t]he	 powers	 not	 delegated	 to	 the	 United	 States	 by	 the	Constitution,	nor	prohibited	by	it	to	the	States,	are	reserved	to	the	States	respectively,	or	to	the	people.”129	Although	there	is	debate	on	the	actual	meaning	of	this	language,	the	decisions	in	Lopez	and	
Morrison	 suggest	 that	 it	 acts	 a	 “shield”	 for	 the	 states,	 reserving	authority	not	granted	to	Congress	under	Article	I	to	the	states.130	
                                                        127.	 See	United	States	v.	Lopez,	514	U.S.	549,	561	(1995).	128.	 See	Missouri	v.	Holland,	252	U.S.	416	(1920).	129.	 U.S.	CONST.	amend.	X.	130.	 See	Martin	Flaherty,	Are	We	to	be	a	Nation?:	Federal	Powers	vs	“States	‘	Rights”	
in	Foreign	Affairs,	70	U.	COLO.	L.	REV.	1277,	1283	(1999)	(explaining	the	“shield”	view	of	federalism).	For	the	alternative	interpretation	of	the	Tenth	Amendment	as	a	“truism,”	see	United	States	v.	Darby	Lumber	Co.,	312	U.S.	100	 (1941)	 (“The	amendment	 states	but	a	
1314	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	For	 example,	Morrison’s	 holding	 that	 VAWA	 exceeded	 Congress’	authority	 under	 its	 Article	 I	 commerce	 power	 “awakened”	 the	Tenth	 Amendment	 by	 concluding	 that	 a	 power	 not	 given	 to	Congress	 (regulating	 sexual	 assault)	 is	 reserved	 to	 the	 states,	although	the	majority	never	actually	cites	the	Tenth	Amendment	in	its	opinion.131	The	 1920	 opinion	 in	 Holland	 is	 seen	 as	 articulating	 an	exception	to	this	Tenth	Amendment	state	shield:	Congress’	Article	I	authority	to	pass	 laws	implementing	treaties.132	Holland	stands	for	 the	 proposition	 that	 even	 if	 a	 regulated	 activity	 exceeds	Congress’	Article	I	authority	(like	violence	against	women	or	gun	possession),	 Congress	 can	 still	 regulate	 the	 activity	 if	 the	 law	implements	 a	 ratified	 treaty.133	The	 facts	 from	Holland	 illustrate	this	 rule.134	 In	 1916,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	(acting	 for	 Canada)	 signed	 the	 Migratory	 Bird	 Treaty,	 which	contained	 an	 agreement	 to	 “adopt	 some	 uniform	 system	 of	protection”	 against	 the	 “indiscriminate	 slaughter”	 of	 migratory	birds.135	To	implement	this	treaty,	Congress	passed	the	Migratory	Bird	Treaty	Act	of	1918,	which	regulated	the	hunting	and	capture	of	migratory	 birds	 in	 the	United	 States.136	 The	 State	 of	Missouri	challenged	the	 law,	arguing	that	the	regulation	of	wild	game	is	a	reserved	right	of	the	states	under	the	Tenth	Amendment.137	Justice	Holmes	rejected	this	argument,	explaining	that	even	if	an	activity’s	regulation	 is	 reserved	 for	 the	 states,	 Congress	 can	 regulate	 the	
                                                        truism	that	all	is	retained	which	has	not	been	surrendered.	There	is	nothing	in	the	history	of	its	adoption	to	suggest	that	it	was	more	than	declaratory	of	the	relationship	between	the	national	and	state	governments	as	it	had	been	established	by	the	Constitution	before	the	amendment	or	 that	 its	purpose	was	other	 than	 to	allay	 fears	 that	 the	new	national	government	might	seek	to	exercise	powers	not	granted,	and	that	the	states	might	not	be	able	to	exercise	fully	their	reserved	powers.”);	Frandy	St.	Louis,	The	Decline	of	Mandatory	
Physical	Education	 in	Grade	Schools	Resulted	 in	 the	Current	Childhood	Obesity	Crisis	and	
Consequently	an	Unsustainable	Rise	in	Health	Care	Spending,	10	IND.	HEALTH	L.	REV.	629,	651	(2013).	131.	 Morrison,	529	U.S.	at	615	(referring	to	“areas	of	traditional	state	regulation”);	Warren	Norred,	Removing	Mud	in	the	Clean	Water	Act:	The	Ninth	Amendment	as	a	Limiting	
Factor	in	Chevron	Analysis,	14	TEX.	WESLEYAN	L.	REV.	51,	74	(2007)	(explaining	the	Court’s	reliance	on	the	Tenth	Amendment	in	Lopez	and	Morrison).	132.	 Missouri	v.	Holland,	252	U.S.	416,	433	(1920).	133.	 See	id.	134.	 Id.	at	430-32.	135.	 Id.	136.	 Id.	at	431.	137.	 Id.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1315	activity	 under	 its	 constitutional	 authority	 to	 pass	 treaty-implementing	legislation:	To	answer	this	question	it	is	not	enough	to	refer	to	the	Tenth	Amendment	.	.	.	because	by	Article	II,	§	2,	the	power	to	make	treaties	is	delegated	expressly,	and	by	Article	VI	treaties	made	under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 United	 States,	 along	 with	 the	Constitution	and	laws	of	the	United	States	made	in	pursuance	thereof,	are	declared	the	supreme	law	of	the	land.	If	the	treaty	is	valid,	there	can	be	no	dispute	about	the	validity	of	the	statute	under	Article	I,	§	8	as	a	necessary	and	proper	means	to	execute	the	powers	of	the	Government	.	.	.138	
B.	Holland	as	Congress’	Basis	for	Implementing	VAWA	under	
CEDAW	Another	 illustration	 of	 the	 Holland	 rule	 involves	Morrison,	where	the	Court	held	that	the	provision	of	VAWA	granting	women	a	 federal	 cause	 of	 action	 for	 sexual	 assault	 exceeded	 Congress’	authority.139	Even	though	Congress	does	not	have	the	authority	to	pass	 the	VAWA	provision	under	Morrison,	 the	rule	 from	Holland	suggests	 that	 Congress	would	 have	 such	 authority	 if	 the	 United	States	 ratified	 a	 treaty	 with	 a	 commitment	 to	 provide	 sexual	assault	victims	a	 federal	 cause	of	 action.	CEDAW,	a	1979	United	Nations	 General	 Assembly	 treaty,	 has	 such	 a	 provision.	 CEDAW	General	Recommendation	19	includes	gender-based	violence	as	a	kind	 of	 gender	 discrimination,	which	 requires	 a	 judicial	 remedy	under	 CEDAW.140	 Although	 UN	 general	 recommendations	(sometimes	 called	 “general	 comments”)	 are	 not	 legally	 binding,	they	provide	interpretive	guidance	by	articulating	how	signatory	nations	 can	 fulfill	 their	 treaty	 obligations.141	 The	 United	 States,	however,	is	the	only	nation	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	that	has	not	
                                                        138.	 Id.	at	432.	139.	 Morrison,	529	U.S.	at	618	(“The	regulation	and	punishment	of	intrastate	violence	that	 is	 not	 directed	 at	 the	 instrumentalities,	 channels,	 or	 goods	 involved	 in	 interstate	commerce	has	always	been	the	province	of	the	States”).	140.	Comm.	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 Discrimination	 Against	 Women,	 General	Recommendation	No.	19:	Violence	Against	Women,	U.N.	Doc.	A/47/38	(1992).	 	141.	 See	United	States	v.	Duarte-Acero,	296	F.3d	1277,	1279	(11th	Cir.	2002);	Rice,	
supra	note	11;	Lisa	Davis,	Preventing	Torture:	An	Introduction	to	the	Symposium	Issue,	11	N.Y.	CITY	L.	REV.	179,	180	(2008).	
1316	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	yet	 ratified	 CEDAW.142	 President	 Jimmy	 Carter	 only	 signed	 the	treaty	in	1980,	and	treaties	are	not	effective	in	the	United	States	until	 they	 are	 ratified.143	 If	 the	 United	 States	 ratified	 CEDAW,	Congress	 might	 have	 the	 authority	 to	 pass	 the	 same	 VAWA	provision	struck	down	by	Morrison	as	a	valid	exercise	of	its	Article	II	treaty-implementing	power	under	Holland.144	
Holland’s	 removal	 of	 the	 Tenth	 Amendment	 as	 a	 barrier	 to	treaty-implementing	legislation	has	been	criticized	as	broadening	Congress’	 regulatory	 authority.145	 Justice	 Scalia’s	 concurrence	 in	
Bond	 v.	 United	 States	 makes	 this	 point	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	holding	from	Lopez	could	be	reversed	if	the	United	States	simply	“[negotiated]	a	treaty	with	Latvia	providing	that	neither	sovereign	would	 permit	 the	 carrying	 of	 guns	 near	 schools.”146	 Professor	Michael	Glennon	argues,	however,	that	Justice	Scalia’s	fears	have	not	 materialized,	 since	 US	 treaties	 mostly	 focus	 on	 “bread-and-butter	 international	 issues”–not	 local	 activity	 traditionally	regulated	 by	 states,	which	 is	more	 likely	 to	 implicate	 the	 Tenth	Amendment.147	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	overrule	Holland	in	the	2014	criminal	case	Bond,	but	Chief	Justice	Roberts	dodged	the	question	through	statutory	interpretation	by	holding	that	the	defendant’s	conduct	did	not	fall	within	the	treaty-implementing	statute.148	
                                                        142.	 Johanna	Kalb,	Dynamic	Federalism	in	Human	Rights	Treaty	Implementation,	84	TUL.	L.	REV.	1025,	1034,	1060-61	n.185	(2010)	143.	 Id.	144.	 Barbara	Stark,	Domestic	Violence	and	 International	Law:	Good-Bye	Earl	 (Hans,	
Pedro,	Gen,	Chou,	etc.),	47	LOY.	L.	REV.	255,	279	(2001).	For	another	illustration	of	Congress’	authority	 to	 regulate	 activity	 under	 its	 treaty-implementing	 power,	 even	 though	 the	activity	would	normally	exceed	its	enumerated	powers,	see	Gerald	L.	Neuman,	The	Global	
Dimension	of	RFRA,	14	CONST.	COMMENT.	33,	46	(1997)	(arguing	that	even	if	the	Religious	Freedom	 Restoration	 Act’s	 creation	 of	 religious	 exemptions	 exceeds	 Congressional	authority,	Congress	could	justify	the	law	as	an	implementation	of	the	ICCPR’s	guarantee	of	the	“[f]reedom	to	manifest	one’s	religion	or	beliefs”	under	Holland).	145.	 See	 S.	 REP.	 NO.	 412,	 83RD	 CONG.,	 1ST	 SESS.	 1	 (1953)	 (Senator	 John	 Bricker	proposed	 a	 constitutional	 Amendment	 to	 overrule	Holland	 and	 limit	 Congress’	 treaty-implementing	authority:	 “[a]	 treaty	 shall	become	effective	as	 internal	 law	only	 through	legislation	which	would	be	valid	in	the	absence	of	a	treaty.”);	Charles	A.	Lofgren,	Missouri	
v.	Holland	in	Historical	Perspective,	1975	SUP.	CT.	REV.	77,	118.	146.	 Bond	v.	United	States,	572	U.S.	844,	878	(2014)	(Scalia,	J.,	concurring).	147.	Michael	J.	Glennon	&	Robert	D.	Sloane,	The	Sad,	Quiet	Death	of	Missouri	v.	Holland:	
How	Bond	Hobbled	the	Treaty	Power,	41	YALE	J.	INT’L	L.	51,	58	(2016).	148.	Stephanie	Peral,	Bond	v.	United	States:	Deciphering	Missouri	v.	Holland	and	the	Scope	of	 Congress’s	 Powers	when	 Implementing	 a	Non-Self-Executing	Treaty,	 9	DUKE	 J.	CONST.	L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	SIDEBAR	179,	188	(2014).	
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C.	The	Nagarwala	Court	Should	Have	Held	That	the	ICCPR	
Authorizes	Congress	to	Criminalize	FGM	The	ICCPR,	which	was	the	treaty	at	issue	in	Nagarwala,	was	adopted	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 General	 Assembly	 in	 1966,	 and	went	into	effect	in	1976.149	The	United	States	ratified	the	treaty	in	1992	with	several	 reservations.150	One	of	 the	reservations	 is	 the	United	States’	declaration	that	Articles	1	through	27	of	the	ICCPR	are	 not	 “self-executing.”151	 A	 self-executing	 treaty	 “operates	 of	itself	 without	 the	 aid	 of	 any	 legislative	 provision,”	 meaning	 the	treaty	 becomes	 “the	 supreme	 law	 of	 the	 land”	 after	 ratification	without	 Congress	 implementing	 its	 provisions	 through	legislation.152	A	non-self-executing	treaty	like	the	ICCPR,	however,	requires	Congress	to	use	its	treaty	implementing	power	to	enact	the	provisions	of	 the	treaty	as	domestic	 law.153	Courts	have	held	that	 legislation	 implementing	 a	 treaty	 needs	 to	 be	 at	 least	“rationally	related”	to	the	treaty.154	The	government	in	Nagarwala	argued	that	the	FGM	Act	can	be	justified	 as	 an	 implementation	 of	 two	 provisions	 of	 the	 ICCPR:	Article	3	and	Article	24.155	Article	3	of	the	ICCPR	states	that	“[t]he	States	 Parties	 to	 the	 present	 Covenant	 undertake	 to	 ensure	 the	equal	 right	 of	men	and	women	 to	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 all	 civil	 and	political	 rights	 set	 forth	 in	 the	 present	 Covenant.”156	 In	 a	 brief	paragraph,	 the	 Nagarwala	 Court	 rejected	 the	 government’s	argument	 that	 the	 FGM	 Act	 was	 a	 “necessary	 and	 proper”	implementation	of	 ICCPR	Article	3,	 pointing	out	 that	 there	 is	no	
                                                        149.	 ICCPR,	 supra	note	24,	 at	171;	Canadian	Civil	 Liberties	Association,	Summary:	
International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (ICCPR),	 CCLA	 (Oct.	 27,	 2015),	https://ccla.org/summary-international-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights-iccpr/	[https://perma.cc/YNS3-NNG2].	150.	 American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union,	FAQ:	 The	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 &	 Political	 Rights	
(ICCPR),	 ACLU	 (Apr.	 2019),	 https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr	 [https://perma.cc/32CQ-8W56];	 U.S.	 reservations,	 declarations,	 and	
understandings,	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	138	CONG.	REC.	S4781-01	(daily	ed.	Apr.	2,	1999).	151.	 U.S.	 reservations,	 declarations,	 and	 understandings,	 International	 Covenant	 on	
Civil	and	Political	Rights,	138	CONG.	REC.	S4781-01	(daily	ed.	Apr.	2,	1999).	152.	 Medellin	v.	Texas,	552	U.S.	491,	505	(2008)	(quoting	Foster	v.	Neilson,	27	U.S.	253,	299	(1829)).	153.	 Id.	154.	 United	 States	 v.	 Lue,	 134	 F.3d	 79,	 84	 (2d	 Cir.	 1998)	(citing	McCulloch	 v.	Maryland,	17	U.S.	316	(1819)).	155.	 United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613,	617-18	(E.D.	Mich.	2018).	156.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	3.	
1318	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	rational	 relationship	 between	 FGM	 and	 “civil	 and	 political	rights.”157	In	the	court’s	view,	civil	and	political	rights	include	“the	freedom	 of	 expression,	 the	 right	 to	 participate	 in	 elections,	 and	protections	for	defendants	in	criminal	proceedings,”	while	the	FGM	Act	seeks	to	ban	a	“particular	form	of	physical	abuse.”158	The	court’s	analysis	of	ICCPR	Article	3,	though	brief,	is	likely	correct.	Specific	examples	of	the	“civil	and	political	rights”	included	in	the	ICCPR	are	freedom	of	movement;159	the	right	to	a	fair	and	public	 hearing	 by	 an	 impartial	 tribunal;160	 freedom	 of	 thought,	conscience,	 and	 religion;161	 peaceful	 assembly;162	 freedom	 of	association	with	others;163	 and	protection	of	 ethnic,	 religious,	or	linguistic	 minorities.164	 Although	 the	 ICCPR	 never	 defines	 “civil	and	political	rights,”	the	rights	listed	in	the	treaty	suggest	that	the	ICCPR	 does	 not	 encompass	 FGM,	 a	 “particular	 form	 of	 physical	abuse.”165	The	court’s	more	controversial	holding	is	that	the	FGM	Act	is	not	a	valid	implementation	of	ICCPR	Article	24(1).166	Article	24(1)	of	 the	 ICCPR	 states	 that	 “[e]very	 child	 shall	 have,	 without	 any	discrimination	as	to	race,	colour,	sex,	 language,	religion,	national	or	 social	origin,	property	or	birth,	 the	 right	 to	 such	measures	of	protection	as	are	required	by	his	status	as	a	minor,	on	the	part	of	his	 family,	 society	 and	 the	 State.”167	 Even	 though	 the	 court	concedes	that	the	relationship	between	Article	24(1)	and	the	FGM	Act	is	“arguably	closer”	than	that	of	Article	3,	the	court	dismisses	the	government’s	argument	in	just	two	sentences:	“Article	24	is	an	anti-discrimination	 provision,	 which	 calls	 for	 the	 protection	 of	minors	 without	 regard	 to	 their	 race,	 color,	 sex,	 or	 other	characteristics.	As	laudable	as	the	prohibition	of	a	particular	type	of	 abuse	of	girls	may	be,	 it	does	not	 logically	 further	 the	goal	of	protecting	children	on	a	nondiscriminatory	basis.”168	
                                                        157.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	618.	158.	 Id.	159.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	12.	160.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	14.	161.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	18.	162.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	21.	163.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	22.	164.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	27.	165.	 United	States	v.	Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	613,	618	(E.D.	Mich.	2018).	166.	 Id.	167.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	24,	art.	24(1).	168.	 Nagarwala,	350	F.	Supp.	3d	at	618.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1319	Judge	 Friedman	 essentially	 reasons	 that	 Article	 24(1)’s	protection	of	children	“without	discrimination	as	to	.	.	.	sex,”	has	no	rational	 relationship	 to	 the	 FGM	 Act,	 which	 draws	 a	 sex-based	distinction	by	specifically	protecting	females.169	This	brief,	literal,	textual	 analysis	 ignores	 established	 Supreme	 Court	 precedent	regarding	 the	 tools	 of	 treaty	 interpretation.	 Although	 a	 conflict	existed	 between	 the	 Rehnquist	 Court	 justices	 regarding	 the	permissible	sources	of	treaty	interpretation,	the	2008	decision	in	
Medellín	 v.	 Texas170	 reaffirmed	 the	 Court’s	 willingness	 to	 utilize	interpretive	 tools	 beyond	 the	plain	 text	 of	 treaties.171	 The	Court	recognized	that	although	treaty	interpretation	should	“begin	with	[the	 treaty’s]	 text,”	 a	 ratified	 treaty	 is	 essentially	 “an	 agreement	among	sovereign	powers,”	so	the	Court	can	consider	“negotiation	and	 drafting	 history	 of	 the	treaty	as	well	 as	 ‘the	 postratification	understanding’	of	signatory	nations.”172	Daniel	Rice	makes	a	strong	case	that	Judge	Friedman	failed	to	consider	the	“negotiation	and	drafting	history”	of	the	ICCPR	in	its	decision.173	 When	 President	 George	 H.W.	 Bush	 transmitted	 the	ICCPR	 to	 the	 Senate	 Foreign	 Relations	 Committee,	 his	administration	 included	 an	 “understanding,”	 explaining	 that	Article	24	 could	be	 interpreted	 in	 light	of	 the	UN	Human	Rights	Committee’s	General	Comments	regarding	gender	discrimination	(the	 Human	 Rights	 Committee	 is	 the	 group	 responsible	 for	overseeing	 the	 ICCPR’s	 implementation).174	Although	 the	George	H.W.	 Bush	 Administration’s	 “understanding”	 only	 references	General	 Comment	 18,	 which	 explains	 nondiscrimination	 in	general,	 General	 Comment	 28	 elaborates	 on	 this	nondiscrimination	concept	by	clarifying	that	countries	should	ban	“cultural	or	religious	practices	which	jeopardize	the	freedom	and	well-being	of	female	children,”	which	seems	to	encompass	FGM.175	Perhaps	the	strongest	indicator	from	the	Human	Rights	Committee	that	 the	 ICCPR	 combats	 FGM	 is	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Committee’s	
                                                        169.	 Rice,	supra	note	11.		170.	 Medellin	v.	Texas,	552	U.S.	491,	491	(2008).	171.	 David	J.	Bederman,	Medellín’s	New	Paradigm	for	Treaty	Interpretation,	102	AM.	J.	INT’L	L.	529,	530	(2008).	172.	 Medellin,	552	U.S.	at	507	(citing	Zicherman	v.	Korean	Air	Lines	Co.,	516	U.S.	217,	226	(1996))	(emphasis	added).	173.	 Id.;	Rice,	supra	note	11.	174.		S.	Rep.	No.	102-23,	at	14	(1992);	see	also	Rice,	supra	note	11.	175.	 S.	Rep.	No.	102-23,	at	14	(1992);	see	Rice,	supra	note	11.	
1320	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	statement	that	it	needs	FGM	statistics	from	the	countries	where	the	practices	 are	 prevalent	 to	 gauge	 compliance	with	 ICCPR	 Article	24.176	Although	the	Human	Rights	Committee’s	statements	are	not	legally	 binding	 on	 treaty	 signatories,	 the	 Eleventh	 Circuit	 has	recognized	 that	 their	General	Comments	are	a	guiding	source	of	interpretation	for	the	ICCPR.177	
D.	Congress	Likely	has	the	Authority	to	Pass	the	FGM	Act	if	the	
United	States	Ratifies	CEDAW	The	 FGM	 Act,	 like	 VAWA,	 might	 find	 firmer	 footing	 in	provisions	 of	 the	 signed-but-not-ratified	 treaty	 CEDAW.178	CEDAW’s	creation	was	facilitated	by	the	Commission	on	the	Status	of	 Women	 (the	 “CSW”),	 a	 group	 founded	 in	 1946	 as	 a	subcommission	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 Commission	 on	 Human	Rights.179	 Although	 the	 CSW	 started	 as	 a	 small	 group	 of	 fifteen	representatives	 from	 fifteen	 countries,	 the	 CSW	has	 become	 the	principal	global	 intergovernmental	body	 for	promoting	women’s	rights.180	 As	 a	 longtime	 advocate	 against	 FGM,	 the	 CSW	 was	instrumental	in	supporting	a	UN	General	Assembly	Agenda	titled	
Intensifying	 global	 efforts	 for	 the	 elimination	 of	 female	 genital	
mutilations.181	In	 1974,	 the	 CSW	 began	 drafting	 CEDAW	 with	 the	 goal	 of	creating	 a	 “single,	 comprehensive	 and	 binding	 international	instrument”	to	combat	discrimination	against	women.182	The	UN	
                                                        176.	 U.N.	Doc.	CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10	(2000);	see	Rice,	supra	note	11.	177.	 See	United	States	v.	Duarte-Acero,	296	F.3d	1277,	1279	(11th	Cir.	2002);	see	also	Rice,	supra	note	11.	178.	 Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	against	Women,	Dec.	 18,	 1979,	 1249	U.N.T.S.	 13	 [hereinafter	 CEDAW];	 see	 Johanna	Kalb,	Human	Rights	
Treaties	 in	 State	 Courts:	 The	 International	 Prospects	 of	 State	 Constitutionalism	 After	
Medellin,	115	PENN	ST.	L.	REV.	1051,	1052	(2011).	179.	 A	 brief	 history	 of	 the	 Commission	 on	 the	 Status	 of	 Women,	 UN	 WOMEN,	https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/brief-history	 [https://perma.cc/34JG-6BSZ]	 (last	visited	Apr.	5,	2020);	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	against	
Women	 -Twentieth	 Anniversary	 1979-1999,	 UNITED	 NATIONS,	https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw20/history.htm	[https://perma.cc/B3DF-ND8C]	 (last	 visited	 Apr.	 5,	 2020)	 [hereinafter	 CEDAW	 1979-1999].	180.	 Commission	 on	 the	 Status	 of	 Women,	 UN	 WOMEN,	https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw	[https://perma.cc/36CB-5WHK]	(last	visited	Apr.	5,	2020).	181.	 G.A.	Res.	C.3/67/L.21/Rev.1	(Nov.	16,	2012).	182.	 CEDAW	1979-1999,	supra	note	179.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1321	General	 Assembly	 adopted	 CEDAW	 in	 1979	 with	 a	 vote	 of	 130	Member	States	in	favor	of	the	treaty,	zero	against	the	treaty,	and	ten	abstentions.183	As	of	2020,	189	nations	have	signed,	ratified,	or	acceded	to	CEDAW.184	Only	two	of	these	189	nations	have	signed	but	not	ratified	CEDAW—the	United	States	and	Palau.185	Some	 suggest	 that	 opposition	 to	 CEDAW	 ratification	 in	 the	United	 States	 comes	 from	 the	 “idiosyncratic	 recommendations”	made	by	the	United	Nations	Committee	to	member	nations.186	The	United	Nations	Committee	 reviews	member	nations’	 compliance	with	 CEDAW,	 and	 provides	 recommendations	 on	 how	 to	 better	implement	the	treaty,	sometimes	emphasizing	controversial	issues	like	 abortion.187	 In	 particular,	 CEDAW	 Article	 12(1)	 states	 that	“States	 Parties	 shall	 take	 all	 appropriate	 measures	 to	 eliminate	discrimination	against	women	in	the	field	of	health	care	in	order	to	ensure,	on	a	basis	of	equality	of	men	and	women,	access	to	health	care	 services,	 including	 those	 related	 to	 family	 planning.”188	Professor	 Ann	 Elizabeth	Mayer	 counters	 CEDAW	 never	 actually	mentions	 abortion,	 pointing	 to	 a	 1994	 Senate	 Foreign	 Relations	Committee	 statement	 that	 nothing	 in	 CEDAW	 creates	 a	 right	 to	abortion.189	 Professor	 Mayer	 acknowledges,	 however,	 that	 this	statement	 might	 have	 been	 made	 to	 appease	 conservative	Senators’	 constituency.190	Others	have	suggested	 that	 the	United	States’	 delay	 in	 ratifying	 CEDAW	 is	 attributable	 to	 a	 history	 of	“congressional	mistrust	and	hostility	toward	international	treaties,	particularly	those	concerning	human	rights	issues.”191	
                                                        183.	 Id.;	 Frequently	 Asked	 Questions	 (FAQ)	 about	 CEDAW,	 UN	 WOMEN,	https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/cedaw-human-rights/faq	[https://perma.cc/8LXA-J9WV]	(last	visited	Apr.	5,	2020).	184.	 Status	of	Treaties:	8.	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	
Against	 Women,	 U.N.	 TREATY	 COLLECTION	 (Apr.	 12,	 2020)	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en	[https://perma.cc/WW4V-QB39].	185.	 Id.;	see	Mark	P.	Lagon,	Reflections	on	Global	Justice	and	American	Exceptionalism:	
The	United	States	as	a	Model	for	the	World?,	WORLD	AFFAIRS	42,	47	(2017).	186.	 Id.	187.	 Id.;	146	CONG.	REC.	S3925-02	(Mar.	8,	2000)	(Statement	of	Jesse	Helms).	188.	 CEDAW,	supra	note	178,	art.	12.	189.	 Ann	Elizabeth	Mayer,	Reflections	on	the	Proposed	United	States	Reservations	to	
CEDAW:	Should	the	Constitution	Be	an	Obstacle	to	Human	Rights?,	23	HASTINGS	CONST.	L.Q.	727,	807	(1996).	190.	 Id.	191.	 Julia	Ernst,	U.S.	Ratification	of	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	
Discrimination	 Against	 Women,	 3	 MICH.	 J.	 GENDER	 &	 L.	 299,	 312	 (1995).	 For	 another	
1322	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	If	 Judge	 Friedman	 is	 correct	 about	 the	 FGM	 Act	 exceeding	Congress’	commerce	power	in	Nagarwala,	the	FGM	Act	might	still	be	 a	 valid	 exercise	 of	 Congress’	 treaty-implementing	 authority	under	Holland	 if	the	United	States	ratifies	CEDAW.	Article	2(f)	of	CEDAW	is	the	party	nations’	commitment	to:	condemn	discrimination	against	women	in	all	its	forms,	agree	to	pursue	by	all	appropriate	means	and	without	delay	a	policy	of	eliminating	discrimination	against	women	and,	to	this	end,	undertake:	(f)	.	.	.	 all	 appropriate	 measures,	 including	 legislation,	 to	modify	 or	 abolish	 existing	 laws,	 regulations,	 customs	 and	practices	which	constitute	discrimination	against	women.192	Further,	CEDAW	Article	5(a)	states	that:	States	Parties	shall	take	all	appropriate	measures:	(a)	To	modify	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 patterns	of	 conduct	 of	men	and	women,	with	a	view	to	achieving	the	elimination	of	prejudices	 and	 customary	 and	 all	 other	 practices	which	 are	based	on	the	idea	of	the	inferiority	or	the	superiority	of	either	of	the	sexes	or	on	stereotyped	roles	for	men	and	women.193	Although	 neither	 of	 these	 provisions	 specifically	 reference	FGM,	 the	 references	 to	 “customs”	 and	 “practices”	 based	 on	“discrimination”	 or	 “stereotyped	 roles”	 encompasses	 FGM	more	directly	than	Articles	3	and	24	of	the	ICCPR,	which	broadly	refer	to	“civil	 and	 political	 rights.”194	 In	 1990,	 the	 Committee	 on	 the	Elimination	 of	 Discrimination	 Against	 Women	 (the	 “CEDAW	Committee”)	explicitly	clarified	that	CEDAW	covers	the	eradication	of	FGM	in	General	recommendation	14.195	The	CEDAW	Committee	recommended	 that	member	states	 should	 “take	appropriate	and	effective	measures	with	a	view	to	eradicating	the	practice	of	female	circumcision.”196	 Nine	 years	 later,	 the	 CEDAW	 Committee	
                                                        argument	that	CEDAW	does	not	contain	a	commitment	to	support	abortion,	see	Rangita	de	Silva	de	Alwis	&	Amanda	M.	Martin,	 “Long	Past	Time”:	CEDAW	Ratification	in	the	United	
States,	3	U.	PENN.	J.	L.	&	PUB.	AFFAIRS	15,	46	(2018).	192.	 CEDAW,	supra	note	178,	art.	2(f).	193.	 CEDAW,	supra	note	178,	art.	5(a).	194.	 CEDAW,	supra	note	178,	arts.	2(f),	5(a).	195.	 G.A.	Res.	45/38,	General	recommendation	No.	14:	Female	circumcision	(1990),	
available	 at	https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/INT_CEDAW_GEC_3729_E.pdf	[https://perma.cc/TJ3S-HNJP].	196.	 Id.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1323	confirmed	 this	 interpretation	 when	 it	 issued	 General	recommendation	 19,	 which	 states	 that	 CEDAW	 nations	 should	combat	 cultural	 or	 religious	 practices	 like	 FGM,	which	 carries	 a	high	risk	of	“death	and	disability.”197	
E.	The	Post-Ratification	Conduct	of	CEDAW	Signatory	Nations	
Suggests	That	CEDAW	Could	be	a	Basis	for	an	FGM	Ban	in	the	
United	States	In	addition	to	these	clarifying	CEDAW	recommendations,	the	fact	that	some	member	nations	have	based	domestic	FGM	bans	on	CEDAW	 indicates	 that	 the	 treaty	 should	 encompass	 FGM.	 The	Supreme	Court	has	recognized	that	the	interpretations	of	treaties	by	 foreign	 governments	 and	 their	 courts	 after	 ratification	 are	valuable	 indicators	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 treaty	 provisions.198	 Even	strict	 textualists	 like	 Justice	 Scalia	 utilize	 this	 post-ratification	conduct	approach.199	An	illustration	of	post-ratification	conduct	as	an	interpretive	tool	 is	Zicherman	v.	Korean	Airlines,	 in	which	the	Supreme	Court	considered	 whether	 plaintiffs	 could	 recover	 loss-of-society	damages	for	the	death	of	a	family	member	in	a	plane	crash	under	the	Warsaw	Convention.200	Article	17	of	the	Warsaw	Convention	states	that	airline	carriers	“shall	be	liable	for	damage	sustained	in	the	 event	 of	 the	 death	 or	 wounding	.	.	.	 ”201	 In	 holding	 that	cognizable	 damages	 under	 the	 Warsaw	 Convention	 should	 be	determined	by	 the	domestic	 law	of	 the	 signatory	parties,	 Justice	Scalia’s	 unanimous	 decision	 emphasizes	 the	 post-ratification	conduct	 of	 the	 signatory	 parties	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	
                                                        197.	 G.A.	Res.	54/38/Rev.1,	chap.	I.	General	recommendation	No.	24:	Article	12	of	the	Convention	 (women	 and	 health)	 (1999),	 available	 at	https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/INT_CEDAW_GEC_4738_E.pdf	[https://perma.cc/W3LZ-FLZQ];	U.N.	Population	Fund,	supra	note	123.	198.	 Medellin	v.	Texas,	552	U.S.	491,	507	(2008);	Zicherman	v.	Korean	Air	Lines	Co.,	Ltd.,	516	U.S.	217,	226	(1996);	VED	P.	NANDA	ET	AL.,	LITIGATION	OF	INTERNATIONAL	DISPUTES	IN	U.S.	COURTS	§	10:20	(2019).	199.	 Zicherman,	516	U.S.	at	226.	200.	 Id.	at	218-19.	201.	 Id.	 at	 221;	 Convention	 for	 the	 Unification	 of	 Certain	 Rules	for	International	Carriage	by	Air	(the	“Warsaw	Convention”)	art.	7,	Oct.	12,	1929,	49	Stat.	3000,	137	L.N.T.S.	11	(emphasis	added).	
1324	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	treaty	phrase	“damage	sustained.”202	Justice	Scalia	points	out	that	England,	 Germany,	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 passed	 domestic	legislation	 specifying	 damages	 under	Warsaw	Convention	 cases,	suggesting	 that	 these	 signatory	 nations	 shared	 this	interpretation.203	 Further,	 Canada	 passed	 national	 legislation	specifying	the	kinds	of	plaintiffs	entitled	to	a	cause	of	action	under	the	 Warsaw	 Convention,	 but	 left	 the	 question	 of	 recoverable	damages	 for	 the	 provinces	 to	 decide.204	 Justice	 Scalia	 and	 the	unanimous	Supreme	Court	saw	the	conduct	of	signatory	nations’	legislatures	and	courts	as	valuable	evidence	of	a	treaty’s	meaning,	since	 “[signatory	 nations’]	 conduct	 generally	 evinces	 their	understanding	of	the	agreement	they	signed.”205	CEDAW	 signatory	 nations	 have	 recognized	 the	 treaty	 as	 a	commitment	 to	 combat	 FGM	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	domestic	 legislation.206	 Ghana,	 a	 country	 where	 approximately	3.8%	of	women	are	victims	of	FGM,207	ratified	CEDAW	in	1989.208	Shortly	 after	 Ghana’s	 ratification,	 Ghanaian	 President	 Jerry	Rawlings	issued	a	formal	declaration	denouncing	FGM.209	In	1994,	in	 response	 to	 a	 CEDAW	 recommendation,	 Ghana’s	 Parliament	reaffirmed	 its	 commitment	 to	 eradicate	 FGM	 by	 amending	 its	Criminal	Code	of	1960	(Act	29)	to	criminalize	FGM,	using	similar	language	 to	 the	 United	 States’	 FGM	 Act:	 “[w]hoever	 excises,	infibulates[,]	or	otherwise	mutilates	the	whole	or	any	part	of	the	labia	 minora,	 labia	 majora[,]	 and	 the	 clitoris	 of	 another	 person	commits	an	offence	and	shall	be	guilty	of	a	second	degree	felony	and	 liable	 on	 conviction	 to	 imprisonment	 of	 not	 less	 than	 three	years.”210	
                                                        202.	 Zicherman,	 516	 U.S.	 at	 218-19;	 Michelle	 M.	 Ressler,	Compensable	 Damages	
Revisited	Under	the	Warsaw	Convention:	Zicherman	v.	Korean	Air	Lines,	A	New	Look	at	Loss	
of	Society,	5	U.	MIAMI	Y.B.	INT’L	L.	65,	103	(1997).	203.	 Id.	204.	 Zicherman,	516	U.S.	at	218-19;	Ressler,	supra	note	202,	at	103.	205.	 United	States	v.	Stuart,	489	U.S.	353,	369	(1989).	206.	 Matilda	Aberese	Ako	&	Patricia	Akweongo,	The	limited	effectiveness	of	legislation	
against	female	genital	mutilation	and	the	role	of	community	beliefs	 in	Upper	East	Region,	
Ghana,	17	REPRODUCTIVE	HEALTH	MATTERS	47,	47	(2009).	207.	 Ghana:	 The	 Law	 and	 FGM,	 28TOOMANY	 1	 (2018),	https://www.28toomany.org/static/media/uploads/Law%20Reports/ghana_law_report_v1_(september_2018).pdf	[https://perma.cc/EL9N-TR4F]	[hereinafter	28TOOMANY].	208.	 Ako	&	Akweongo,	supra	note	206,	at	47.	209.	 Id.	210.	 Ghana	Criminal	Code	of	1960	(Act	29)	§	69(A)(1);	Ako	&	Akweongo,	supra	note	206,	at	47-48.	
2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1325	Similarly,	 Senegal’s	 criminalization	 of	 FGM	 is	 seen	 as	 an	implementation	 of	 CEDAW,	 which	 Senegal	 signed	 in	 1980,	 and	ratified	 in	 1985.211	 In	 Senegal,	 approximately	 22.7%	 of	 women	aged	 fifteen	 to	 forty-nine	 are	 FGM	 victims,	 although	 prevalence	varies	drastically	by	region	(in	the	southern	region	of	Senegal,	FGM	rates	are	as	high	as	77.8%).212	In	1999,	Senegal	amended	its	Penal	Code	 to	 criminalize	 FGM,	 although	 a	2018	 report	 estimates	 that	fewer	 than	 eight	 prosecutions	 have	 taken	 place	 under	 the	statute.213	 Other	 nations	 responding	 to	 CEDAW	 ratification	 by	combatting	FGM	through	criminalization,	education,	and	outreach	programs	 include	 Benin,	 Burkina	 Faso,	 and	 Côte	 d’Ivoire.214	American	 courts’	 willingness	 to	 examine	 the	 post-ratification	CEDAW	 interpretation	 of	 these	 nations	 is	 more	 evidence	 that	CEDAW	could	justify	Congress’	implementation	of	the	FGM	Act.	
V.	CONCLUSION	Although	the	DOJ	has	withdrawn	its	appeal	to	the	Sixth	Circuit	in	 the	 Nagarwala	 case,	 its	 letter	 to	 the	 House	 announcing	 the	withdrawal	contained	a	proposed	amendment	to	the	FGM	Act	 in	light	 of	 Judge	 Friedman’s	 decision.	 215	 Instead	 of	 simply	criminalizing	 FGM,	 the	 proposed	 amendment	 would	 criminalize	FGM	 with	 some	 nexus	 to	 interstate	 commerce.216	 In	 particular,	section	116(e)(3)	of	 the	proposed	amendment	criminalizes	FGM	where	“any	payment	of	any	kind	was	made	.	.	.	 .”	 	 for	the	FGM.217	Daniel	Rice	argues	that	this	would	be	an	ineffective	amendment,	as	it	would	be	practically	 identical	 to	 the	pre-Nagarwala	version	of	the	 statute.218	 He	 points	 out	 that	 it	 would	 “almost	 always”	 be	
                                                        211.	 28TOOMANY,	supra	note	207;	Ako	&	Akweongo,	supra	note	206,	at	47.	212.	 28TOOMANY,	supra	note	207.	213.	 Senegal	Criminal	Code	art.	299;	28TOOMANY,	supra	note	207.	214.	 Ako	&	Akweongo,	supra	note	206,	at	47.	215.	 Testimony	of	Professor	Beth	Van	Schaack,	Stanford	Law	School	before	the	Tom	Lantos	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 United	 States	 House	 of	 Representatives	 Pursuing	Accountability	 for	 Atrocities	 (June	 13,	 2019),	 available	 at	https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/documents/PursuingAccountability_VanSchaack.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/E3F3-MVYU]	[hereinafter	Beth	Van	Schaack	Testimony];	Letter	from	Noel	J.	Franisco,	supra	note	33	at	B-1.	 216.	 Beth	Van	Schaak	Testimony,	supra	note	215;	Letter	from	Noel	J.	Franisco,	supra	note	33,	at	B-1.	217.	 Letter	from	Noel	J.	Franisco,	supra	note	33,	at	C-1.	218.	 Rice,	supra	note	11.	
1326	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	possible	 to	 find	 some	 connection	 between	 FGM	 and	 interstate	commerce,	regardless	of	how	the	statute	is	written.219	This	amendment,	however,	seems	to	effectively	bring	the	FGM	Act	 within	 Congress’	 commerce	 power	 under	 the	 narrow	“economic	 in	 nature”	 interpretations	 of	 Lopez	 and	 Morrison	(particularly	section	116(e)(3)	of	the	amended	FGM	Act).220	After	this	 amendment,	 the	 FGM	Act	 is	 no	 longer	 criminalizing	FGM	 in	general,	 an	 act	 which	 could	 occur	 non-economically.221	 Section	116(e)(3)	 of	 the	 amendment	 essentially	 changes	 the	 regulated	activity	from	“FGM”	to	“FGM	for	payment,”	which	seems	to	be	an	inherently	 economic	 activity	 falling	 squarely	 within	 Congress’	commerce	power.222	In	the	wake	of	the	Nagarwala	decision,	some	states	have	taken	a	step	in	the	right	direction	by	pushing	for	the	criminalization	of	FGM.223	State	FGM	criminalization	is	essential,	since	the	lack	of	a	federal	 ban	 leaves	 states	without	 FGM	 laws	 at	 risk	 of	 becoming	“destination	 states”	 for	 cutting.224	 In	Kentucky,	 eight	Republican	and	three	Democratic	senators	introduced	a	bipartisan	bill	which	would	make	FGM	a	 felony	offense,	requiring	 law	enforcement	to	undergo	training	about	FGM,	and	provide	FGM	victims	a	10-year	window	to	sue.225	State	Senator	Tom	Buford	stated	that	he	has	not	heard	of	 any	 opposition	 to	 the	bill	 in	Kentucky.226	 Similarly,	 the	Washington	 legislature	 has	 introduced	 a	 bill	which	would	make	
                                                        219.	 Id.	220.	 United	States	v.	Morrison,	529	U.S.	598,	613	(2000);	Letter	from	Noel	J.	Franisco,	
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2020]	 UNITED	STATES	V.	NAGARWALA	 1327	FGM	a	felony.227	FGM	is	now	a	state	crime	in	Michigan;228	however,	the	 state’s	ban	did	not	 go	 into	effect	until	after	 the	DOJ	brought	federal	charges	in	2017	against	Dr.	Nagarwala	for	performing	FGM	in	Michigan.229	In	 some	 states,	 however,	 FGM	 criminalization	 has	 faced	greater	 hurdles.	 In	 Maine,	 Republican	 and	 Democratic	 state	senators	 proposed	 a	 bill	 which	 would	 make	 performing	 FGM,	transporting	a	minor	outside	the	state	for	FGM,	or	consenting	to	the	 FGM	 of	 a	 girl	 a	 felony	 offense.230	 The	 bill	 passed	 in	Maine’s	Senate,	 but	 died	 in	 the	House.231	 Although	 there	was	 consensus	that	the	practice	should	end,	some	Democrats	in	the	Maine	House	opposed	the	bill	because	it	criminalized	“knowingly	consenting”	to	a	 girl’s	 FGM,	 which	 some	 viewed	 as	 potentially	 stigmatizing	immigrants.232	 Some	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 language	 imposing	penalties	on	those	who	consent	to	a	girl’s	FGM	might	discourage	victims	 from	 seeking	 treatment	 for	 their	 FGM	 complications	 to	protect	 their	 parents.233	 Similarly,	 a	 proposed	 Connecticut	 bill	which	would	make	FGM	a	state	felony	was	opposed	by	testimony	from	 Susan	 Yolen	 of	 Planned	 Parenthood	 of	 Southern	 New	England.234	Yolen	argued	that	although	the	organization	opposes	the	 practice,	 she	 believes	 that	 FGM	 criminalization	 “may	 only	further	 isolate	 those	who,	now	that	 they	are	 in	 the	U.S.,	 can	and	should	become	more	fully	integrated	into	our	way	of	life.”235	Yolen	instead	advocated	for	“public	health	interventions”	to	end	FGM.236	
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1328	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	States	like	Maine	and	Connecticut	must	criminalize	FGM	(like	a	majority	of	US	states)237	now	that	the	federal	FGM	ban	has	been	held	unconstitutional.	Kimberly	Schaefer,	an	immigration	attorney	in	 Idaho	 (which	 criminalized	 FGM	 in	 2019)238	 argues	 that	criminalizing	 FGM	 in	 the	 United	 States	 allows	 women	 seeking	asylum	in	the	United	States	to	escape	FGM	in	their	home	country	feel	 safer.239	 Shaefer	 argues	 that	 women	 coming	 to	 the	 United	States	 to	escape	FGM	realize	 that	 “[the]	safety	 that	 they	 thought	they	 had	 isn’t	 really	 here”	 in	 states	 where	 the	 practice	 is	 not	criminalized.240	 Further,	 Health	 Law	 Professor	 Sondra	 Crosby	testified	on	behalf	of	a	proposed	Massachusetts	law	criminalizing	FGM,	pointing	out	that	“enacting	a	law	against	FGM	could	serve	as	a	 deterrent	 and	 provide	 women	 with	 a	 basis	 to	 resist	 cultural	pressure	from	their	families	to	have	their	daughters	cut.”241	FGM,	a	procedure	 often	 performed	with	 “scissors,	 dirty	 razor	 blades	 or	knives,	 and	 in	 unsterile	 conditions	without	 anesthesia”	 is	 a	 life-altering	physical	assault	with	devastating	health	consequences.242	Judge	Friedman’s	decision	in	Nagarwala	signals	a	need	for	states	to	take	the	 lead	in	protecting	women	and	girls	 from	this	horrific	practice.			
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